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Abstract 
What are the long run consequences of planning and providing basic infrastructure in neighborhoods, 
where people build their own homes? We study "Sites and Services" projects implemented in seven 
Tanzanian cities during the 1970s and 1980s, half of which provided infrastructure in previously 
unpopulated areas (de novo neighborhoods), while the other half upgraded squatter settlements. Using 
satellite images and surveys from the 2010s, we find that de novo neighborhoods developed better 
housing than adjacent residential areas (control areas) that were also initially unpopulated. Specifically, 
de novo neighborhood are more orderly and their buildings have larger footprint areas and are more 
likely to have multiple stories, as well as connections to electricity and water, basic sanitation and access 
to roads. And though de novo neighborhoods generally attracted better educated residents than control 
areas, the educational difference is too small to account for the large difference in residential quality 
that we find. While we have no natural counterfactual for the upgrading areas, descriptive evidence 
suggests that they are if anything worse than the control areas. 
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1 Introduction
Africa’s cities are growing rapidly. The continent’s total population is currently around 1.2 billion,
and it is expected to roughly double by 2050 (United Nations 2015). At the same time, Africa’s rate
of urbanization is expected to rise from around 40 to 60 percent from 2010-2050 (Freire et al. 2014).
Consequently by 2050 almost a billion people are expected to join the roughly half a billion people
who currently populate Africa’s cities. But many of these cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
face considerable challenges, including poor infrastructure and low quality housing (see Henderson
et al. 2016 and Castells-Quintana 2017). According to UN Habitat (2013), as many as 62% of this
region’s urban dwellers live in slums, whose population is expected to double within 15 years. Marx
et al. (2013) argue that these slums are the result of a myriad of policy failures, and they may be the
physical locus of a poverty trap.
There are various policy options for dealing with the challenges posed by African urbanization.
One option is to allow neighborhoods to develop organically without much enforced planning. A
second option is for the state to not only plan but actually build public housing. This option is ex-
pensive for cash-strapped governments in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, but it has been implemented
in South Africa (e.g. Franklin 2015). Between these two alternatives lies a third option of laying out
basic infrastructure on the fringes of cities, and allowing people to build their own homes. Develop-
ment along these lines has been advocated by Romer and Angel at the World Bank.1 A fourth option
is to step in and improve infrastructure in areas where low quality housing develops.2
Despite the immense scale of the problem, we have relatively little systematic evidence on the
long run implications of these different approaches to urban neighborhood development, and the
gap in our knowledge is particularly acute when it comes to the third approach of basic infrastructure
provision before people build their own homes. Moreover, we know very little about the long run
merits of the different approaches in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in its secondary cities, which
are home to the majority of its urban population.3
We focus our paper on understanding the long run consequences of the third approach compared
to the first ("default") option. Specifically, we study de novo neighborhoods, which were planned and
developed in greenfield areas on the fringes of existing Tanzanian cities. The development included
the delineation of residential plots and the provision of basic infrastructure, such as roads, roadside
drainage, and (in some cases) water mains and public buildings with nearby streetlights. People
were then offered the opportunity to pay a fee for the servicing of the plots and build their own
homes.4 To provide a counterfactual, we select nearby control areas that were greenfields before the
1See for example:
http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/Urbanization%20as%20Opportunity%20-%20Paul%20Romer.pdf
and http://financingcities.ifmr.co.in/blog/tag/dr-shlomo-angel/.
2This fourth approach has recently been studied in the context of Indonesia (Harari and Wong 2017).
3A few databases shed light on secondary cities in Africa, including are Brinkhoff (2017), Agence Française de
Développement (2011), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2012), and Tanzania National Bureau of Sta-
tistics (2011).
4The land remained the property of the Tanzanian state.
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projects we study began. With this counterfactual in hand, we compare long run outcomes in the
resulting de novo neighborhoods to those in the control areas.
In addition, we provide descriptive evidence on the fourth approach by studying the conditions
in nearby upgrading areas, which received infrastructure investments similar to those in the de novo
areas, but only after people built homes on undeveloped land. We do not have a causal interpretation
for the effects of upgrading because, for these areas, we do not have a suitable counterfactual as we
do in the de novo case.
We investigate how these neighborhoods develop in the long run, and we ask a number of ques-
tions. First, does early infrastructure investment lead to complementary investments in housing
quality? Second, to what extent does the initial infrastructure persist in the long run? Third, what
are the sorting patterns of people with different schooling levels into the resulting neighborhoods?
And fourth, to what extent are housing quality differences accounted for by the sorting of owners
and residents?5
We begin with a model, which considers how de novo infrastructure investments incentivize peo-
ple to capitalize on the complementarity between infrastructure and housing, and invest in housing
quality. But in other areas, people invest in housing when infrastructure is underdeveloped and not
expected to improve, so they build low quality housing. When they unexpectedly receive better in-
frastructure, they can either rebuild better housing (foregoing their initial investments), or relinquish
the opportunity to take full advantage of the improved infrastructure.6
The model accounts for exogenous rebuilding of houses which takes place over time. This gen-
erates a process of continuous improvement outside the de novo areas, and our baseline analysis
suggests that after 30 years the gap in housing quality between de novo and other areas narrows
considerably.7 We then consider alternative scenarios where people outside de novo areas: (a) are
poor and credit constrained so they cannot invest in high quality housing; (b) face higher expropria-
tion risk because de novo areas better protect property rights through the surveying and delineation
of plots; or (c) face a risk of infrastructure deterioration if not enough neighbors invest in housing
quality. We find that this last scenario is particularly informative, since it can account for large dif-
ferences in housing quality and land values after 30 years, which we document in our empirical
analysis.
In our empirical analysis, we study an ambitious set of basic infrastructure projects that were
designed to improve the quality of residential neighborhoods. These projects, called “Sites and Ser-
vices”, were co-funded by the World Bank and formed an important part of its urban development
strategy during the 1970s and 1980s in several countries. In Tanzania, “Sites and Services” were also
co-funded by the Tanzanian government and they were implemented in two rounds – the first one
began in the 1970s (World Bank 1974a, World Bank 1974b and 1984) and the second in the 1980s
5Throughout this paper we refer to "owners" as those with de-facto rights to reside on a parcel of land or rent it out.
6If the government could credibly commit to upgrading this problem might be mitigated, but in practice it is often
difficult to achieve such firm commitments.
730 years is approximately the time that elapsed from the early 1980s until the time we measure the outcomes.
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(World Bank 1977a, 1977b and 1987). For reasons that we discuss below, Sites and Services ceased to
be an important channel for the World Bank’s urban development strategy from the late 1980s.
The Sites and Services projects in Tanzania fell into two broad classes. One involved de novo de-
velopment of previously unpopulated areas. The other involved upgrading of pre-existing squatter
settlements. Both project types benefitted from varying degrees of basic infrastructure. These typi-
cally included the construction of (often unpaved) roads and roadside drainage, and in some places
also water mains.8 Together, these projects laid the groundwork for 12 de novo neighborhoods and
12 upgrading neighborhoods. Dar es Salaam accounted for just over half of the area covered by the
two neighborhood types, and the rest of the neighborhoods were spread across six secondary cities -
Iringa, Morogoro, Mbeya, Mwanza, Tabora, and Tanga. (World Bank 1974b, 1977b, 1984, and 1987).
Our study compares de novo neighborhoods to nearby control areas, which were greenfield areas
before the Sites and Services projects began, but were not part of the Sites and Services projects.9 To
address potential concerns about selection in the location of the treated areas, we control for distance
to the central business district (CBD) of the city in which each area lies, and also report estimates that
restrict the analysis to within 500 meters (and even 250 meters) of the boundary between each type
of treated area and the control areas.
Since we cannot pinpoint untreated squatter areas, we also compare the upgrading neighbor-
hoods to the same control areas mentioned above. Though this analysis is descriptive rather than
causal, it does tell us how upgrading neighborhoods developed with investments similar to the de
novo neighborhoods taking place after squatters had already settled.
One important aspect of neighborhood development is the sorting of owners and residents with
different characteristics into different areas. The target population for both de novo and upgrading
areas were the (mostly poor) local residents. Some of the poorest, however, could not afford the de
novo plots, which ended up with those who could, and over time there were further sales as the
ownership and residence patterns changed endogenously. We study the implications of this sorting
in two ways. First, in cities where the data permit we include specifications with owner fixed effects,
and we find that our results are robust to these controls. Second, when it comes to residents, we
cannot include person fixed effects since people typically live in just one home at any point in time.
Therefore, we instead we report the sorting of residents by schooling, which is a common proxy for
lifetime earnings. And as we explain below, we also show that our findings on residential quality are
robust to conditioning on residents’ schooling.
We begin our empirical analysis with a description of the population and density of the different
treatment areas. We find that as of 2002, Sites and Services neighborhoods were home to a little over
half a million people. Almost 80 percent of them lived in upgrading neighborhoods and the rest in
de novo neighborhoods. This reflects the fact that upgrading neighborhoods covered a total area that
was roughly 50 percent larger, and their population density was approximately 140 percent higher
8In some places a small number of public buildings such as markets and schools, along with surrounding streetlights,
were also constructed.
9Where the data permit, we also use the rest of the city area as an alternative control group.
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than the de novo neighborhoods.10
We study the quality of residential infrastructure in the Sites and Services neighborhoods and
their nearby surroundings using high resolution daylight satellite images (DigitalGlobe 2016). We
find that compared to the untreated areas nearby, which were (like the de novo neighborhoods)
greenfield areas in the 1960s, buildings in de novo neighborhoods now have a significantly larger
footprint. Buildings in de novo neighborhoods are more likely to be close neighboring ones, but they
are also more similarly aligned to them, reflecting a more regular neighborhood layout. We also find
some evidence that buildings in de novo areas may have higher quality roofs. In contrast, upgrading
neighborhood buildings are quite similar to those in control areas in terms of their footprint size,
and they are much more likely to have closely packed buildings. A "family of outcomes" Z-index
suggests that de novo neighborhoods have significantly higher residential quality than those in the
control areas, which are in turn better than those in the upgrading areas. We also find that both de
novo and upgrading areas are less likely to be empty than the control areas, and that on average the
upgrading areas have almost twice as many buildings per unit of land as the control and de novo
areas.
We further examine the Sites and Services neighborhoods using detailed building-level survey
data on three of the cities, which are located in different corners of Tanzania: Mbeya (in the south-
west), Tanga (in the northeast), and Mwanza (in the northwest).11 We find that residential buildings
in de novo neighborhoods not only have larger footprints, but they are also more likely to have
multiple stories. In addition, they are more likely to be connected to electricity and to have better
sanitation. At the same time, their roof materials are no better than those in the control areas. In
contrast, buildings in upgrading neighborhoods are similar to those in the control areas and in some
respects even worse.12 These findings are robust to including owner fixed effects, which compare
housing units with the same owner located in different treatment and control areas. All these results
suggest that the early infrastructure investments in de novo areas were complemented by private
investments.
We also examine whether the initial infrastructure investments persisted differently in de novo
and upgrading areas. Using both the imagery and survey data, we find that buildings in de novo
areas are significantly more likely to have access to roads than those in control and upgrading areas.
For two cities (Mbeya and Mwanza), where the investment included the provision of water mains,
we also find that buildings in de novo areas also have better access to water supply.
We further examine whether the size of the initial infrastructure investment mattered for present
day outcomes. To that end, we explore differences between the First Round Sites and Services in-
vestments (from the late 1970s), which included not only roads and roadside drainage, water mains,
10The overall scale of Sites and Services projects means that we cannot rule out general equilibrium effects across neigh-
borhoods, but as of 2002 the population of Sites and Services neighborhoods was typically less than 15% of each city’s total
population. This mitigates potential concerns about the role of general equilibrium effects in the setting we study.
11As we explain below, we do not have survey data for the other four cities where Sites and Services were implemented.
12Of course, upgrading areas might have been even worse had it not been for the infrastructure investment.
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and public buildings with nearby street lighting; and the Second Round Sites and Services invest-
ments (from the early 1980s), which mostly involved roads and roadside drainage and in the case of
upgrading areas also water mains. We find that de novo neighborhoods set up in the First Round,
which involved larger investments, stand out as having the highest residential quality. Among the
rest, de novo neighborhoods from the Second Round (which involved fewer investments than the
First Round) do better than the upgrading neighborhoods, including the First Round upgrading
neighborhoods, which received larger investments. Overall, these findings suggest that the size of
the initial infrastructure investments matters, at least for de novo neighborhoods.
To get another perspective on the difference in outcomes across the two types of Sites and Ser-
vices neighborhoods, we compare data on land values from Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam
(Tanzania Ministry of Lands, 2012). We find that the mean land value per square meter of land in de
novo neighborhoods was in the range of $160-220, compared to about $30-40 in upgrading neighbor-
hoods (in 2017 USD). The project reports indicate that the total infrastructure investment costs per
area in de novo and upgrading were very similar; $2.20 and $2.37 per square meter respectively (in
2017 USD). Both de novo and upgrading areas generally received similar infrastructure investments,
although there were local variations and it is possible that on average de novo areas received some-
what higher investment per land area of plot, because of a greater density of public amenities (such
as roads). In order to compare with present day land values (per plot area, excluding any public
space) we get an upper bound estimate on the cost of $8 per square meter of treated plot area (in
2017 USD).13
Finally, we report evidence on the sorting of households headed by people with different levels
of schooling into neighborhoods. We find that adults in de novo neighborhoods have about two
years of schooling more than those in control areas, while those in upgrading areas are not signif-
icantly different in their schooling from those in control areas. The sorting patterns for heads of
households are similar, as are the patterns that we observe when restricting the sample to Dar es
Salaam. Nonetheless, if we use typical estimates of returns to schooling, the observed differences in
education between neighborhoods account for little of the land value differential between de novo
and upgrading neighborhoods in Dar es Salaam. A regression of housing quality across all seven
cities that controls for residents’ schooling by census enumeration area confirms that while educated
people reside in better quality housing, sorting of residents on schooling accounts for little of the
housing quality advantage of de novo neighborhoods.
Another way to look at the schooling differences is to consider how they reflect different shares
of the adult population with more than primary school education. This group accounts for just over
60 percent of adults in de novo neighborhoods, and around 35-40 percent in de novo and upgrading
neighborhoods. This suggests that despite significant sorting, almost 40 percent of adults in de novo
neighborhoods had no more than primary school education. And as mentioned above, even condi-
tional on their schooling those living in de novo neighborhoods benefit from better housing. Fur-
13See Data Appendix for per unit area cost calculations.
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thermore, even less educated people who initially owned de novo plots and eventually sold them,
likely gained from some of the land value appreciation.14 Together, these findings indicate that the
de novo neighborhoods provide benefits even for those with lower levels of education.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 presents a model of investments in infrastructure and housing in different neighborhoods.
Section 4 discusses the institutional details of the Sites and Services projects and their implementa-
tion. Section 5 describes the data that we use. Section 6 presents our empirical analysis. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the literature on the economics of African cities (Freire et al. 2014). Like Gollin
et al. (2016) we study not only the largest African cities (such as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania), but also
secondary cities, which usually receive less attention. Our contribution to this literature is that we
look within these cities at a fine spatial scale, examining individual neighborhoods and buildings,
using a combination of high resolution daylight satellite images, building-level survey data, and
precisely located census data.
A few recent papers study outcomes not only across African cities but within them (see for ex-
ample Henderson et al. 2016) . Our study differs not only in our focus on secondary African cities,
but also in the longer time horizon we cover. We use historical satellite images and highly detailed
maps going back over 50 years, which allow us to evaluate long run changes in response to spe-
cific infrastructure investments. By combining these with data on individuals, we also provide more
evidence about the sorting of individuals across neighborhoods.
Methodologically, we contribute to the recent literature using high resolution daylight images
and geographical precision (Jean et al. 2016). Like Marx et al. (2017) we study roof quality as a
measure of residential quality. Our measure of quality relies not only on luminosity, but on a detailed
image showing whether roofs are painted (paint reduces the risk of rust and marks roofs as being of
higher quality). We also develop a comprehensive set of measures of residential quality, including
building size, access to roads, and measures of building congestion and regularity of neighborhood
layout.
Our paper is also related to the long run study of neighborhood development. A recent contribu-
tion - in the context of nineteenth century Boston - is Hornbeck and Keniston (2017). The focus of our
paper, however, is on de novo neighborhood developments rather than the development of existing
ones, and our study examines more recent experiences in a developing country.
Previous studies of Sites and Services around the world include surveys (e.g. Laquian 1983) and
critical discussions of the cost and affordability of these projects (Mayo and Gross 1987, Buckley and
14As we discuss below, a few years after Sites and Services were implemented, most of the residents in de novo neigh-
borhoods in Dar es Salaam were still those targeted by the policy, many of whom were poor.
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Kalarickal 2006). There is also some descriptive work on Sites and Services locations in Dar es Salaam
(Kironde 1991 and 1992), which describes the sorting of residents into Sites and Services locations, as
we further discuss below. Other contributions include descriptive work on Sites and Services in Dar
es Salaam (Owens 2012) and an evaluation of the short term impact of more recent slum upgrading
projects in the same city on health, schooling, and income (Coville and Su 2014). There is also short-
run analysis of more recent de novo projects in Dar es Salaam (Kironde 2015). But we are not aware of
any systematic analytical evaluation of the World Bank’s historical Sites and Services projects across
Tanzania as a whole, and their implications on building and neighborhood quality and value.
One recent and closely related paper - on Indonesia rather than Tanzania - is Harari and Wong
(2017). Our findings corroborate theirs that upgrading neighborhoods do not do particularly well in
the long run. Our paper differs from theirs, however, in our focus on de novo neighborhoods, which
they do not study. Our work also differs in documenting the selection of owners and residents into
different neighborhoods.
Also related to our paper is a broader literature on slums (Castells-Quintana 2017, Marx et al.
2017). Our contribution here is to illustrate conditions under which areas of poor quality housing
form (or do not form) and persist. In the context of Dar es Salaam, Ali et al. (2016) study willing-
ness to pay for land titling in poor neighborhoods. Our paper differs from theirs by focusing at the
formation of neighborhoods, rather than at ex-post interventions to title existing ones.
Poor neighborhoods have also been studied in other settings, especially in Latin America and
South Asia. For example, Field (2005) and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find that providing more
secure property rights to slum dwellers in Latin America increases their investments in residential
quality.15 Apart from the difference in setting (we study Tanzania, which is considerably poorer than
Latin America), our focus is on the effects of infrastructure provision to slum dwellers, rather than
on the protection of property rights.
While our paper’s focus is on neighborhoods rather than cities, it is also related to Romer (2010),
who investigates the potential for new Charter cities as pathways for urban development in poor
countries. Specifically, we provide evidence related to Romer’s idea that starting afresh can provide
opportunities for sustained growth. In this respect, our contribution is also related to the position
advocated by Angel, that Sites and Services may be a relevant model for residential development.16
3 Model
To frame our empirical analysis we present a partial equilibrium model of investment in infrastruc-
ture and housing. The model formalizes the intuition that early investment in infrastructure incen-
tivizes people to build higher quality housing. This allows us to explore conditions under which
15In another paper, Galiani et al. (2013) study an intervention that provides pre-fabricated homes costing around
US$1,000 each in Latin America, but come without any infrastructure.
16See for example this interview with Angel, which discusses this idea:
http://www.smartcitiesdive.com/ex/sustainablecitiescollective/conversation-dr-shlomo-angel/216636/
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the differences between early and late investments may or may not affect housing quality and land
values in the long run.17
We consider a discrete time model with a population of infinitely lived, profit maximizing people.
In each neighborhood there is a continuum of people, each of whom has a single plot of land.18 In
every period of the model (corresponding to a year), each person faces a sequence of events. First
she decides whether to build (or rebuild) a house. Following Hornbeck and Keniston (2017) and
Henderson et al. (2017), we assume that owners cannot renovate incrementally, and that houses
do not depreciate.19 Second, each person gets a payoff which is a function of house quality and
infrastructure quality. Finally, there is an exogenous probability that the house is destroyed and
needs to be rebuilt in the following period.
We consider three different types of neighborhoods. First, the control areas can be thought of
as locations where infrastructure investment remains at a low level, which we define as I1. Second,
there are de novo areas with a higher level of investment, I2 > I1. Finally, there are upgrading
neighborhoods, where the initial level of investment is low (I1), but after one period it is unexpectedly
upgraded to the higher level of the de novo areas (I2).20 We also consider other possible differences
between de novo and upgrading that may potentially affect long run outcomes. First, people in
upgrading areas may be poorer and more credit constrained, and this could affect their investment
decisions. Second, by surveying plots in advance the de novo intervention may reduce ownership
uncertainty and the risk of expropriation, which could also affect investment decisions. Finally, there
may be feedback from the overall level of neighborhood investment back to infrastructure quality,
and we examine the implications that this may have for housing quality and land values.
In this model, people maximize profits by solving the following Bellman equation:
V (q, I) = Max
(
r (q, I) + δE [V (q, I)]
r (q, I) + δE [V (q, I)  c (q)] , (1)
where r is return on house (e.g. rent), q is the current house quality, I is infrastructure quality, δ
reflects the time preference, q is the optimal house quality and c (q) is the cost of building a house
of quality q. We assume that the rent function is r (q, I) = qα I 1 α, and the construction cost function
17Though our model looks at different aspects of neighborhood quality, we discipline our analysis by adapting several
modelling assumptions from Hornbeck and Keniston (2017).
18As discussed above, we refer to these colloquially as "owners", by which we mean those who de-facto get the rent from
the house built on each plot, while not necessarily being an owner in the formal sense. We further discuss issues related to
property rights and expropriation risk below.
19The assumption that rebuilding a higher quality house requires a fresh start is particularly relevant for low quality
housing that characterizes poorer neighborhoods in East African cities. It may be possible to make minor improvements to
a house built of tin or mud walls, by for instance, replacing a thatched roof with tin. However, demolition and construction
from scratch is required to make meaningful improvements in housing quality to what Henderson et al. (2017) call formal
building technology that is durable. For instance, brick walls, a foundation, multiple stories, or plumbing would all be
very difficult to add to a small house of tin or mud. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that no incremental
improvement is possible. Relaxing this would reduce the benefit of early (de novo) investments.
20In the Institutional Background section below we discuss the investments that were made as part of the Sites and
Services projects. These suggest that though the investment per total land areas in de novo and upgrading were similar,
upgrading plot were more numerous but also likely smaller. We do not reflect this difference in the model, which can be
thought of as considering costs and values holding plot size fixed.
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is c (q) = cq2.
The model reflects a tradeoff between keeping the current quality q and upgrading to the optimal
quality q. If a house is exogenously destroyed it is always rebuilt at the optimal quality q. But if a
person faces a change in infrastructure quality I, she may also prefer to rebuild the house of quality
q.
To solve the model, note that starting from an empty plot, the optimal house quality is:
q (I) =

αI1 α
2c (1  δ+ dδ)
 1
2 α
, (2)
where d is the exogenous rebuilding rate.
This means that in the first period we see housing quality q1  q (I1) in control and upgrading
neighborhoods, and q2  q (I2) in de novo neighborhoods. But before the second period begins,
people in upgrading neighborhoods see an unexpected increase in infrastructure quality, which rises
to I2. As a result, people in upgrading neighborhoods have two options. They can upgrade right
away, in which case their expected payoff from that point on is:
pi2  pi (q2, I2) = q
α
2 I
1 α
2   cdqα2
1  δ   (1  d) cq
2
2. (3)
Alternatively, they can keep the current quality q1 and only upgrade to q2 when their house needs
rebuilding. In this case their expected payoff is:
pi1,I2  pi (q1, I2) = q
α
1 I
1 α
2 + dδpi (q2, I2)
1  δ+ dδ . (4)
To make further progress we calculate these payoffs for a number of different parameter combi-
nations. In our baseline specification we normalize I = 1, and c = 1, and we use a time preference
parameter δ = 0.95. We use a specification that places equal weight on housing and infrastructure
(α = 0.5). One parameter which deserves more discussion is the exogenous rebuilding rate, d. We
use the building replacement rate of around 5 percent per year that we observe in our data, instead
of the 1 percent rate that Hornbeck and Keniston (2017) use in their study of Boston.21 The building
replacement rate that we observe in our data and use in our model is also higher than the rate of 3.2
found for recent Kenyan data (Henderson et al. 2017).
As Appendix Figure A1 illustrates, there is a critical value Icrit2 , such that pi
 
q1, Icrit2

= pi
 
q2, Icrit2

.
If the improvement in infrastructure is not very large
 
I1 < I2 < Icrit2

then people do not upgrade
their houses right away, but only as houses require rebuilding. In this case there is a waste involved in
upgrading because people do not make immediate use of the complementarity between infrastruc-
ture and housing. But if the investment is large enough, people in upgrading areas rebuild right
away. In this case the waste induced by upgrading is different, and it comes from scrapping the first
period investment. For poor people in particular this waste can be non-trivial, which is one reason
21We estimate the rebuilding rate from the data, as we describe below.
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to prefer de novo investments over upgrading wherever possible.
We move on from discussing the relative merits of early and late investments to examine their
implications for building quality and land values after 30 years, corresponding roughly to the period
that has elapsed since the end of the Sites and Services projects until our data were collected. Specif-
ically, we compare the level of infrastructure investment I2 that is just below the critical threshold
Icrit2 , and is therefore most likely to explain the large differences that we observe empirically between
de novo and upgrading locations. The first column of Appendix Table A1 shows that in our base-
line Scenario 1a, building quality in upgrading locations is around 91 percent of building quality in
de novo locations. This reflects the fairly rapid rebuilding rate of 5 percent per year, which means
that even though no upgrading takes place right away, within 30 years most buildings are replaced.
This finding suggests that while early investment has benefits (as discussed above), it’s unlikely to
explain large and persistent gaps in housing quality. Moreover, because this scenario assumes that
infrastructure is of the same quality in both locations, the value of an empty parcel of land, V (0, I),
should be identical in de novo and upgrading.
The next few columns of Appendix Table A1 show what happens when we vary the key parame-
ters. In Scenario 1b we reduce the weight of infrastructure in the rent function, increasing the weight
on house quality from 0.5 to 0.8, but our results above are largely unchanged. This is also the case
in the next column (which corresponds to Scenario 1c), where people are assumed to be less patient.
In the following column, which corresponds to Scenario 1d, we see that reducing the rate of build-
ing replacement from 5 percent (as we see in our data) to 1 percent (which Hornbeck and Keniston
2017 use for Boston) reduces the ratio of housing quality in upgrading compared to de novo to 0.68,
because more buildings do not get replaced within 30 years. The fifth column, which corresponds to
Scenario 1e, shows that increasing construction costs does not matter for our outcomes compared to
the baseline, since both change proportionately.
Having introduced the baseline and the variations of the parameter values, we now consider
augmenting the model in three additional ways, reflecting potential differences between de novo
and upgrading neighborhoods other than the timing of investment. In Scenario 2 we consider the
possibility that people in upgrading neighborhoods are poor and credit constrained. To maximize the
potential impact of credit constraints, we assume that the maximum quality of housing that people
in upgrading neighborhoods can afford is q1, so they cannot afford to rebuild at a higher standard
following the infrastructure improvement. The residents still benefit to some extent from the better
infrastructure, however, and in this case we assume that they can sell their land to other individuals,
who are not credit constrained. The results in the sixth column of Appendix Table A1 show that this
matters for relative housing quality in upgrading locations, but of course this cannot explain any
differences in land values.22
In Scenario 3 we consider the possibility that people in upgrading areas face risk of expropriation.
22Owners in de novo areas may also be credit constrained. Such constraints may lead to a slow process of construction.
In the empirical analysis we study whether this process still left empty areas in the long run.
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This may be because the origin of squatter settlements makes their property rights less secure. Or
perhaps one of the virtues of the de novo investment is that it clearly delineates the plots, reducing
concerns that ownership may be contested. In this case we assume that the risk of expropriation in
upgrading areas is 5 percent per year.23 The results in the seventh column, which correspond to this
scenario, suggest that in practice even this change does not result in large gaps in housing quality
and land prices between de novo and upgrading.
Finally, in Scenario 4 we consider the possibility that there is feedback from the average neigh-
borhood housing quality to the infrastructure. This reflects the possibility that poor quality housing
may increase the risk that infrastructure deteriorates. Kironde (1994, page 464) discusses evidence
that infrastructure did in fact deteriorate in one of the upgrading slums in Dar es Salaam. He specif-
ically mentions (i) deterioration of roadside drainage due to lack of maintenance, and (ii) private
construction on land that was earmarked for public use. In the model we assume that infrastructure
quality remains at I2 if the majority of the neighborhood residents invest in housing, and otherwise
it reverts back to I1, so that people benefit from the improved infrastructure for one period only. As
the final column of the table shows, in this case the quantitative implications are large, because the
upgrading neighborhood quality and land prices fall back to what they would have been without
any infrastructure investment.24 This result suggests that spillovers from neighboring houses, either
in the from of infrastructure deterioration or through other channels that we do not model, could
play an important role in determining long run outcomes.
We summarize our main takeaways from the model for our empirical analysis as follows. First,
the model assumes that there is a complementarity between infrastructure and private investments.
In practice, this suggests that we should expect to see better housing (e.g. better amenities, multi-
story buildings) in areas that received early investment, that is de-novo areas. Second, we expect
to see better quality housing in locations that received more infrastructure investments. Third, the
model suggests that in absence of spillovers the initial presence of poor and credit constrained own-
ers in some neighborhoods is not in itself likely to explain large and persistent differences in housing
quality. In our analysis we shed light on the role of differences in ownership patterns by incorpo-
rating owner fixed effects in at least some of our regressions. Fourth, in the model the persistence
or deterioration of initial infrastructure investments may play an important role in shaping hous-
ing quality, and we examine the extent of persistence across neighborhoods empirically. Finally, the
model suggests that different investment strategies may affect land prices. To the extent that these
effects are large, we study the degree to which households with different earnings capacities, as prox-
ied by the schooling of household heads, sort into the different neighborhoods. But before we turn
to the empirical analysis, we first describe the institutional setting of the Sites and Services projects
23Our chosen parameter value is not too different from Collin et al. (2015). They elicit owners’ perceived expropriation
risk in Temeke slums, close to the CBD of Dar es Salaam, which implies a risk of around 8% per year. The same paper also
documents positive but modest effects of titling on housing investments.
24The list of scenarios described above does not, of course, exhaust the possible differences between de novo and up-
grading neighborhoods, since there could well be other factors or combinations of factors (see related informal discussion
in Marx et al. 2013).
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in Tanzania.
4 Institutional Background
This paper studies the long term effects of an ambitious set of projects that were designed to improve
the quality of residential neighborhoods in Tanzania. These projects, called “Sites and Services”,
were co-funded by the World Bank and were an important part of its urban development strategy
during the 1970s and 1980s. Their goal was to encourage the poor to construct their own homes on
vacant land and improve squatter settlements. Sites and Services projects were spread across cities
in the developing world, including in countries such as Senegal, Jamaica, Zambia, El Salvador, Peru,
Thailand, and Brazil, as well as Tanzania (Cohen et al. 1983). Of a total World Bank Shelter Lending
of $4.4 billion (2001 US$) from 1972-1986, Sites and Services accounted for almost 50 percent and
separate slum upgrading accounted for over 20 percent.
In Tanzania, Sites and Services were implemented in two rounds – the first in began in the 1970s
(World Bank 1974b and 1984) and the second in the 1980s (World Bank 1977b and 1987). These
projects were financed by the World Bank and the Tanzanian government (World Bank 1974a and
1977a).
The Sites and Services projects in Tanzania fell into two broad classes. The first involved de
novo development of previously unpopulated areas. The second involved upgrading of pre-existing
squatter settlements (sometimes referred to colloquially as “slum upgrading”). Both project types
benefitted from systematic planning, and varying degrees of public infrastructure. The most preva-
lent investments included the survey and delineation of plots, construction of roads (of varying
types, but mostly unpaved), and roadside drainage. In some cases water mains and public build-
ings were also provided. In general, investment in the Second Round was lower. Nevertheless,
taken together, these projects laid the groundwork for 12 de novo neighborhoods and 12 upgrading
neighborhoods spread across seven cities. (World Bank 1974b, 1977b, 1984, and 1987).25 For one
of the 12 de novo neighborhoods (the one in Tanga), we have some uncertainty as to the extent of
infrastructure that was actually provided (World Bank 1987).
In trying to improve urban living in poor countries, Sites and Services projects faced various
challenges, including in the recruitment of staff, acquisition of land, and recovery of costs (Cohen,
Madavo, and Dunkerley 1983). When discussing Sites and Services projects around the world, Mayo
and Gross (1987) and Buckley and Kalarickal (2006) conclude that the standards which these pro-
grams aimed for excluded the poorest urban residents. In addition, in some cases the poor recovery
rates for investment meant that the programs were in practice not self-financed.
For the purpose of our paper we are especially interested in Sites and Services in Tanzania.
25An additional upgrade was planned for the area Hanna Nassif in Dar es Salaam, but it was not implemented as part
of Sites and Services. This area was nevertheless upgraded later on in a separate intervention (Lupala et al. 1997), but it is
excluded from our analysis. Two additional areas, Mbagala and Tabata, were considered for the Second Round of Sites and
Services, but it appears that they were eventually excluded from the project (World Bank 1987 and authors’ conversations
with Kironde).
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Laquian (1983) points out that the de novo projects were meant for income groups between the
20th and 60th income percentile of a country - for the poor, but not for the poorest. Kironde (1991)
concurs and explains that eligibility for de novo sites in Dar es Salaam excluded the poorest and rich-
est households, but targeted an intermediate range of earners which covered over 60% of all urban
households. While we do not have a precise picture of who was awarded the de novo plots, it seems
that the offer to buy into de novo plots was initially given to low income households, including
those displaced from upgrading areas, presumably as a result of building new infrastructure (World
Bank 1984 and Kironde 1991). There is some disagreement as to how this process was implemented
in practice. One key report (World Bank 1984) argues that there were irregularities in this process,
which allowed some richer households to sort into de novo neighborhoods. But in discussing the de
novo sites in Dar es Salaam in the late 1980s, Kironde (1991) argues that most plots were awarded to
the targeted income groups, and that as of the late 1980s "The majority of the occupants (57.9 percent)
are still the original inhabitants but there are many ‘new’ ones who were either given plots after the
original awardees had failed to develop them, or who were given ‘created’ plots. A few, however,
obtained plots through purchase or bequeathment". Taken together, the evidence suggests that de
novo locations did attract some richer households alongside those with more modest means. But
if de novo neighborhoods developed better housing standards (as we discuss below), such sorting
over time was to be expected even if the project had been flawlessly administered.
When it comes to assessing the costs of the Sites and Services projects in Tanzania, we rely mostly
on cost breakdowns of World Bank reports (World Bank 1974b, 1977b, 1984, and 1987), and we cau-
tion that the process of inferring the costs likely involved some measurement error. Translated into
US$2017, our best estimate is that the total costs of Sites and Services in Tanzania were around $83
million (excluding house loan scheme, which later failed, and a few other indirect costs). The First
Round project reports (World Bank 1974a and 1984) indicate that the total infrastructure investment
costs per total area in de novo and upgrading were very similar: $2.20 and $2.37 per square meter re-
spectively (in 2017 USD). Both de novo and upgrading areas generally received similar infrastructure
investments, although there were differences in the way these investments were implemented, as we
explain below. Further, in order to compare with present day land values (per plot area, excluding
public areas) we want an estimate of costs per unit of treated plot area. Due to data limitations,
we could only calculate this for de novo neighborhoods, and our estimate suggests an upper bound
cost of $8 per square meter of treated plot area (in 2017 USD). In the Data Appendix we explain our
estimates of the cost breakdowns in greater detail.
The costs of Sites and Services and the difficulty of recouping them appear to have played a role
in the ending of World Bank financed Sites and Services projects in Tanzania and in other countries
during the 1980s (World Bank 1987). As a result, the share of Sites and Services (including slum
upgrading) in the World Bank’s Shelter Lending fell from around 70% from 1972-1986 to around 15%
from 1987-2005 (Buckley and Kalarickal 2006).
Despite the decline in their policy importance for the World Bank in recent decades, Sites and
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Services projects deserve renewed attention for at least three important reasons. First, as mentioned
above, Africa’s urban population is expected to grow rapidly, adding pressure to its congested cities,
which are struggling to cope with infrastructure requirements. Second, cost recoupment and admin-
istration have become more practical through increased use of digital record keeping as evidenced
by Tanzanian Strategic Cities Project (TSCP) and other recent programs in Tanzania.26 This may also
make it easier to ensure that the program is administered fairly, and benefits the target population.
Finally, Africa’s GDP per capita has grown in recent decades, so it is likely that more people can now
afford better housing, and an important question is how to deliver on this. The historical cost of a
de novo plot is around 2017 US$2,200. If implemented today, some of the costs may be higher (since
labor costs have risen), but land on the fringes of Tanzanian cities is still inexpensive.27 Moreover, al-
ternative programs to deal with the housing problems of Africa’s poor by constructing housing seem
considerably more expensive than a de novo approach of the type we study.28 In the next section, we
describe how we use these and other data to learn about Sites and Services in Tanzania.
5 Data Description
This section explains how we construct the datasets that we use in the empirical analysis (further
details are included in the Data Appendix). First we introduce the main data sources that identify
the Sites and Services locations across all seven cities. Second, we explain how we used these to
outline the treatment and control areas. Third, we explain our choice of units of analysis. Fourth, we
explain how we construct the variables that we use in our analysis. Fifth, we describe auxiliary data
and measures that we use. Lastly, we discuss summary statistics for our main outcomes.
The starting point for our data construction is a series of World Bank reports. We have detailed
information about the plan for First Tanzanian Sites and Services projects, which began in the 1970s
(World Bank 1974b) and its financing (World Bank 1974a) and the subsequent project report (World
Bank 1977b). Similarly, we have detailed information about the Second Tanzanian Sites and Services
project (World Bank 1984) and its financing (World Bank 1977a), and again the subsequent project
report (World Bank 1987). These include detailed descriptions and maps showing the locations of
the treatments in five of the seven cities. For these five cities (Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Tabora, Tanga,
and Morogoro) we used the maps to trace out the de novo and upgrading areas.29
For the two remaining cities, the maps from the project appraisal were unavailable. Therefore, for
26The TSCP was approved by the World Bank in May 2010 (see http://projects.worldbank.org/P111153/tanzania-
strategic-cities-project?lang=en)
27From the authors’ conversation with Wilbard Kombe it seems that the prices per square meter in more recent Tanzanian
government projects with similar attributes to the de novo plots we study were in fact not very different from the prices
we document above.
28According to correspondence with Simon Franklin, from the experience of housing programs in cities such as Addis-
Ababa, four room apartments (with a bathroom) in five-storey blocks entail construction cost of around $10,000, plus a
further $3,000-4,000 for infrastructure and administration. This figure excludes land costs.
29In Dar, two maps were available, 1974 and 1977, differing slightly for Mikocheni area. For all areas, except Tandika
and Mtoni we chose to use the 1974 map, as it appeared more precise in following terrain and roads. However, we had to
use the 1977 map for Tandika and Mtoni, because the 1974 map did not extend as far to the South of Dar.
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Mbeya we asked three local experts to draw the boundaries of treatment.30 For Mwanza we obtained
cadastral maps dating back to 1973 from Mwanza municipality. Since in Mwanza the treatment
was only the de novo plots, the cadastral map was sufficient to get the information for the intended
treatment areas. We defined the treatment area as covering the numbered plots that were of a size that
(approximately) fitted the project descriptions; we also included public buildings into the treatment
areas, to be consistent with the procedure in other cities. This procedure gives us a comprehensive
picture of the 12 de novo and 12 upgrading neighborhoods across all seven cities.
Having defined the treated areas, we now explain how we construct our control areas. Our goal
was to use as controls all greenfield areas within 500 meters of any treatment areas. Starting with all
areas within 500 meters of Sites and Services locations, we exclude areas that were, to the best of our
understanding, either uninhabitable (e.g. off the coast), or built up or designated for non-residential
use prior to the start of the Sites and Services projects. In order to infer what had been previously
developed, we used any historical maps and imagery collected as close as possible to the start of the
Sites and Services project, and where possible before its start date. We used all planned treatment
maps (i.e. 1974 and 1977 maps for Dar es Salaam, and 1977 maps for Morogoro, Iringa, Tanga and
Tabora), the 1973 cadastral map of Mwanza, satellite images from 1966, aerial imagery for Tabora
from 1978, and topographic maps (1967, 1974, and 1978 for Tabora, Iringa, and Morogoro). These
data are derived from United States Geological Survey (2015) and Directorate of Overseas Surveys
(2015). All the areas (with very minor exceptions) were covered by at least one source.
First, we use building outcomes on a grid of 50 x 50 meter blocks, assigning each block to de
novo, upgrading, or control area depending on where its centroid falls. This allows us to measure
non-built up areas within each block, as well as the share of area built and the number of buildings
per area of land. Measuring outcomes in this way relates them to the treatment which took place on
land, rather than buildings.
Second, we use individual building level outcomes (as we describe below) and present these in
the appendix tables. This is in some ways simpler, but the complication is that the buildings are
themselves outcomes.
To study the quality of housing across all 24 Sites and Services locations we use WorldView
satellite images (DigitalGlobe 2016), which provide greyscale data at resolution of approximately
0.5 meters along with multispectral data at a resolution of approximately 2.5 meters. We employed
a company (Ramani Geosystems) to trace out the building footprints from these data for six of the
seven cities. For the final city, Dar es Salaam, we used separate building outlines from a different,
freely available, source - Dar Ramani Huria (2016).
For all seven cities we also used road data from Openstreetmap (2016). We had to clean these data,
so that we only use roads that seem wide enough for a single car to pass through. In this process we
eliminated "roads" between buildings that were close together - in some cases less than one meter
30The experts who kindly helped us were: Anna Mtani and Shaoban Sheuya from Ardhi University, who both were
working on the first round of Sites and Services project; and Amulike Mahenge from the Ministry of Land, who was a past
Municipal Director of Mbeya.
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apart. We also added roads that were visible from the imagery but not reported in Openstreetmap.
For the purpose of constructing our measure of housing quality for all seven cities, we think of
slum areas as typically containing small, low quality, tightly packed, and irregularly laid out build-
ings, with poor access to roads. We therefore define as positive outcomes those opposite of this image
of slums: buildings that are large (and possibly multi-story), have good quality amenities, they are
spaced apart, regularly laid out, and with good access to roads. Our first outcome is the logarithm
of building footprint size, derived directly from the building shapefiles. Second, we use the color
satellite imagery to assess whether each roof is likely painted, and therefore less prone to rust. We
use this as a measure of high quality. Being able to identify whether the roof is colored provides us
with an extra cut on the roof quality spectrum, a measure typically not available in standard sur-
veys of building quality. Next, we use the building shapefiles to compute the distance between each
building and its neighboring building, and create an indicator for buildings whose nearest neighbor
is no less than one meter apart. We also calculate the orientation of each building using the main
axis of the minimum bounding box that contains it. We then calculate the difference in orientation
between each building and its neighboring building, modulo 90 degrees, with more similar orienta-
tions representing a more regular layout.31 Finally, we construct an indicator for buildings that are
within no more than 10 meters from the nearest road. As we discuss below, however, we think of
the road measure as largely representing persistence of infrastructure investments, whereas the other
measures largely reflect complementary investments by the owners.32
For three cities, Mbeya (in southwest Tanzania), Tanga (in northeast Tanzania), and Mwanza (in
northwest Tanzania) we have detailed building-level data from the TSCP survey, which are derived
from a recent a World Bank project implemented by the Prime Minister’s Office of Regional Admin-
istration and Local Government (World Bank 2010). These surveys were carried out by the Tanzanian
government from 2010-2013 and span entire cities, rather than just the Sites and Services areas and
their vicinity. We use these data to build a more detailed picture of building quality in the areas
we study. The TSCP data identify which buildings are outbuildings - including sheds, garages, and
animal pens - and we exclude all these outbuildings from the analysis.33 This leaves us with a sam-
ple of buildings that are used mostly for residential purposes, although a small fraction also serve
commercial or public uses.
For these buildings we construct measures of: the logarithm of building footprint; connection to
electricity; connection to water mains; having at least basic sanitation (usually a septic tank and in
rare cases sewerage); having good (durable) roof materials; having more than one story; and having
road access.34
31If buildings are quite far apart from each other they score higher on our measure of building proximity, but may be
penalized if their orientation is very different from the nearest (but still far) neighboring building.
32Where applicable we then standardize and pool the quality measures together to construct a "family of outcomes"
Z-index (Kling et al. 2007; Banerjee et al. 2015).
33Outbuildings account for around 10-30% of buildings in the areas we consider, where the fraction varies by city. Their
mean size is typically around one third that of the average regular building size.
34We again construct a "family of outcomes" measure based on non-missing observations for each variable.
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In addition to the main dataset, we also use the TSCP data to calculate the rate at which buildings
are rebuilt, which we use in the model section. We use a dataset that includes the construction year
and latest rebuilding year for a sample of houses up to the year 2013.35 In this dataset we only observe
the last reconstruction of a house. For this reason, we use short time intervals to infer the constant
hazard rate. For every year t we know the number of houses standing in that year. For this sample
we compute the share of houses reconstructed since t  1. We average this replacement rate over all
years t. The average number we get from this exercise is close to five percent. One potential bias
would be if the constant hazard assumption does not apply. To address this point, we can verify that
the constant hazard model is consistent with replacement rates we observe for 2 and 3 years going
backwards. Another potential bias might be that this procedure selects for more robust houses as we
go back in time. We observe however that the average observed replacement rate seems similar as
we go back in time in this exercise. The numbers in Henderson, Regan and Venables (2017) imply a
constant hazard of 0.039 for housing in Kenya.
To calculate the population density in each of the neighborhoods, we use data on full population
by enumeration areas (EAs) from the 2002 Tanzanian Census (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics
2011). In cases where an entire EA falls into a Sites and Services neighborhood, we assign its entire
population to that neighborhood. When only a fraction of an EA falls into a Sites and Services neigh-
borhood, we assign to the neighborhood the fraction of the EA’s population that corresponds to the
fraction of the land area that lies within the neighborhood. The mean number of EAs matched to
each neighborhood is 33 for de novo areas and 35 for upgrading areas.36
In addition to the population count from 2002 we have more detailed census data on schooling for
EAs in 2012, albeit only for a 10 percent sample. To use these data we follow a procedure similar to the
one outlined above: we partition each EA that intersects different treatment areas into its constituent
parts. For example, if an EA is divided between de novo, upgrading, and control areas, then we
divide it into three "cut" EAs, each of which lies exclusively within either de novo, upgrading, or the
control areas.37
A separate source of data that we use to work out land values in Sites and Services locations in
Dar es Salaam comes from the Tanzanian Ministry of Lands (2012). These data include estimates of
the value of land at a local area, which is typically smaller than the Sites and Services areas. We use
the names in the data to match the land values to neighborhoods, and then compute a simple mean
of land values within each neighborhood.38
We conclude our discussion of the data that we use with a description of the neighborhoods that
35The construction and reconstruction years are available only for around 10 percent of the houses in the TSCP data.
36We also have population data from the 2012 Tanzanian census, but these data are reported in coarser areas, and using
these to measure population likely results in more measurement error.
37In some cases only a small part of an EA lies inside a treatment or control area, because of a small misalignment
between the observed boundaries of EAs and treatment areas. When this cut EA part is less than 5 percent of the entire EA
area, we exclude this small part of the EA from the analysis.
38We use the same census 2002 boundaries, but at a geographic level between ward and EA that is called ’streets’ in
the land values table and ’village/streets’ in the census. There are typically 2-10 of these in each Treatment area in Dar es
Salaam.
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we study. Appendix Table A2 describes the 12 de novo neighborhoods, which are located in seven
cities. Five of these were part in the First Round of Sites and Services (started in the late 1970s), and
included roads, roadside drainage, water mains, and in some cases also a small number of public
buildings with nearby streetlights. The other seven were part of the Second Round of Sites and
Services (started in the early 1980s), and for the most part included only roads and water mains.
Appendix Table A3 describes the 12 upgrading neighborhoods, which are located in six cities.39
Three of these neighborhoods were upgraded as part of the First Round of Sites and Services, and
they all received roads, roadside drainage, water mains, and again in some cases public buildings
with nearby streetlights. The Second Round upgrading provided similar investments, although with
fewer public buildings.
6 Empirical Analysis
We begin our empirical analysis by describing the number of plots, area covered, and population
density across the different types and rounds of Sites and Services. As Appendix Table A4 shows,
a total of over 45,000 plots were completed by the time Sites and Services projects were concluded
in the 1980s. Of these, about 10,500 plots (just over 23%) were in de novo areas, and the remainder
were in upgrading areas. In total, a little over half a million people lived in Sites and Services areas
in 2002, of which about 107,000 (just over 21 percent) lived in de novo neighborhoods, and the rest
in upgrading neighborhoods. The 2012 population census data that we have access to contain only a
10 percent sample of the population, but they give a generally similar picture to the 2002 census, and
suggest some subsequent population growth.
One takeaway from Table A4 is that the mean number of people per plot in de novo neighbor-
hoods (just over 10) is not very different from the number in upgrading neighborhoods (11). But there
is a sizeable difference between the area taken up by an average plot and its surrounding vicinity:
in de novo areas this was just over 1,000 square meters, compared to just under 500 square meters
in upgrading areas.40 As a result, the mean population density in de novo areas in 2002 was just
under 10,000 people per square kilometer, compared to over 23,000 in upgrading areas. These are
high population densities by international standards, and they are even higher once we take into
account that there is little in the way of high rise buildings in these areas, especially in the upgrading
neighborhoods (more on that below).
The difference in population density mentioned above suggests that de novo and upgrading
neighborhoods developed along different trajectories. To examine the impact of both policy types
on the quality of residential outcomes we compare their outcomes to the control areas. Summary
statistics for our main outcomes are described in Appendix Table A5. The table shows that more
there are more than 20,000 blocks of land and 140,000 individual buildings in the imagery data for
39The seventh city, Mwanza, received a de novo neighborhood but no upgrading neighborhood.
40The actual (present day) plots in First Round neighborhoods in Dar es Salaam appear to be roughly on the order of
half the area, while the rest is taken up by roads and other public areas.
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the seven cities. The number of de novo blocks is about 35 percent smaller than the number of
upgrading blocks, which in turn is a little more than half the number of control blocks. Table A5 also
reports summary statistics for the TSCP survey data, which cover three entire cities (Mbeya, Mwanza
and Tanga). These data cover a richer set of outcomes than the imagery, and allow us to compare
Sites and Services areas not only to nearby control areas but to the rest of the cities that contain them.
At the same time, we do not have survey data for the remaining four Sites and Services cities, so the
TSCP data complement the imagery rather than substitute for it.
Comparing the mean building footprint in the two datasets shows a larger figure in TSCP than
in the imagery (about 132 compared to 85 square meters). This reflects not only a different sample of
cities, but also as mentioned above our exclusion of the (typically much smaller) outbuildings in the
TSCP data. In the TSCP data, only 7 percent have more than a single story; about half are connected
to water mains and about 45 percent are connected to electricity; just over a third have at least basic
sanitation (sewerage connection, or more commonly a septic tank); about 94 percent have "good" roof
materials41; and about 62 percent have some road access. Taken together this suggests that residential
quality is not particularly high by world standards, as the UN Habitat (2013) suggests. Compared
to Tanzania as a whole, however, the areas we study do not seem particularly impoverished (see for
example Minnesota Population Center 2017).
To explore how the outcomes vary by Sites and Services intervention, we begin by estimating
regressions of the form:
yic = βDenovoi + γUpgi + Ctyc + Dist_CBDic + eic, (5)
where yi denotes the outcomes, as in appendix Table A5; Denovoi and Upgi indicate whether unit i is
in de novo or upgrading areas (control areas are the omitted category); Ctyc is a vector of city fixed
effects42; Dist_CBDic measures the distance in kilometers of unit i from the Central Business District
(CBD) in city c, in which it is located; and eic denotes the error term. In our baseline specification we
use 50 x 50 meter blocks as our units of analysis, but later on we use buildings or in some cases units
within buildings, or even cut EAs for different purposes.
Panel A of Table 1 shows regressions using our full baseline sample, spanning all seven cities.
These results indicate that de novo buildings are approximately 37 percent (0.32 log points) larger
than the controls and about 3.7 percentage points (or 28 percent) more likely to have good qual-
ity roofs (which are less prone to rust). These two direct measures of quality suggest that people
in de novo areas made investments in their housing to complement the infrastructure investments
that they received. The next two outcomes show that de novo areas do not differ much from con-
trol buildings in the likelihood of being close to each other (within not more than 1 meter). The de
novo buildings are, however, more similarly aligned to their neighbors, suggesting a more orderly
41Good roof materials include: concrete, metal sheets, clay tiles, and cement tiles. The remaining roofs are made from:
grass/palm, asbestos, timber or other materials.
42In Dar es Salaam, which is made up of three different municipalities (Kinondoni, Temeke, and Ilala), we also include
fixed effects for those municipalities.
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neighborhood organization. Overall, these results suggest that de novo areas have higher quality
residences. In addition, when compared to the control areas, land blocks in de novo areas are signifi-
cantly less likely to be empty of buildings, and have a higher fraction of land that is built, but still do
not have significantly more buildings per unit of land. This all suggests that de novo areas benefit
from high land utilization without suffering from too much congestion.
The equivalent figures for upgrading areas should be interpreted with more caution. This is be-
cause we are still comparing them to the same control areas, which are proper control areas for de
novo but less suitable for upgrading since they were not squatter settlements before the Sites and
Services investment, but instead uninhabited greenfields.43 This caveat notwithstanding, we can
still look at descriptive evidence of the difference between upgrading and control areas. When com-
pared to the control areas, the upgrading areas have slightly smaller buildings, with worse quality
roofs, more tightly packed buildings, very few empty areas, a higher fraction of area that is built up
and more buildings per area. This finding is consistent with our earlier descriptives showing that
population density in upgrading areas tends to be high.44
While the estimates above compare areas that are geographically proximate, there is still a con-
cern that de novo (or upgrading) areas differ from the controls in their locational fundamentals. To
mitigate this concern, the remainder (Panels B-E) of Table 1 reports estimates using only the areas
that are very close to the boundary between the de novo (upgrading) areas and the control areas.
The estimates are similar to those discussed above when we look within 500 meters or even 250 me-
ters of the boundary between de novo and control areas, although the estimates for building size are
smaller (but still significant) and those for roof quality are smaller and imprecise. When we look close
to the boundary between upgrading and control areas (Panels D and E), upgrading areas still look
a bit worse, but some of the differences attenuate. The attenuation of the estimates when we look
close to the boundaries (in Panels B-E) may reflect, at least in part, spillovers between neighboring
buildings with different treatments.45
In Appendix Table A6 we repeat the regressions reported in Table 1, but this time using individual
buildings rather than blocks of land. The results are again quite similar, and perhaps a little stronger:
they again suggest that buildings in de novo areas are of better quality than those in the control areas,
while buildings in upgrading areas look fairly similar to their counterparts in the control areas.
One potential concern that we address has to do with spatial correlations. In our baseline esti-
mates we cluster the standard errors on 500 x 500 meter blocks, in the spirit of Bester et al. (2011) and
Bleakly and Lin (2012), although our data are at a much finer spatial scale than theirs and we cluster
on smaller spatial units than they do. To mitigate concerns about other forms of spatial correlations,
we also estimate standard errors using the methodology of Conley (1999), and the results are again
43As we mention above, we cannot pinpoint the location of untreated squatter areas, which would have been more
natural control areas for upgrading neighborhoods.
44Given our caveat above, we keep in mind that the fact that upgrading are denser than control areas may be a result of
upgrading areas being older squatter settlements than control areas.
45See for example Hornbeck and Keniston (2017) and Redding and Sturm (2016).
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similar (results available on request).
In sum, results for all seven cities using the satellite image data suggest that de novo areas have
larger and more regularly oriented buildings, and possibly have better quality roofs. To get a more
detailed picture of the differences in residential quality we turn to the TSCP data for Mbeya, Mwanza,
and Tanga. In Table 2 we report results again using specification (5), but this time excluding out-
buildings. The resulting picture from the survey data is broadly consistent with our findings from
the imagery data, and indeed even stronger. As Panel A shows, buildings in de novo areas have
a footprint that is larger (by 58 percent or 0.46 log points) than the control areas. They are also 11
percentage points (or about 124 percent) more likely to be multi-story buildings. This multi-story
result is important, because building up is a type of investment that cannot be easily changed in
low-quality residential buildings in Africa (see for example Henderson et al. 2016). This finding is
also consistent with our model’s assumption of irreversible investments.
Turning to other measures of housing quality, de novo areas in TSCP cities do not have sig-
nificantly better roof materials (though the variation in this measure is limited, because very few
buildings in our sample have poor materials). However they are 30 percentage points (64 percent)
more likely to be connected to electricity and 20 percentage points (55 percent) more likely to have
some sanitation (at least a septic tank, or in rare instances sewerage). All this adds up to much
higher overall building quality in de novo areas, consistent with the hypothesis of complementarity
between early infrastructure investments and subsequent private investments. Once again we see
that de novo areas are less empty and more built up than the control areas.
The picture for upgrading areas is similar to the one we find using the satellite images: by most
measures upgrading areas are either similar to the controls or worse, and they contain the most
buildings per unit of land.
In Panels B and C we show that de novo areas look better than controls even when we restrict
attention to areas that are within 500 meters or 250 meters of the boundary between de novo and
control areas. In Panel D we take the opposite approach, comparing de novo areas to the rest of the
buildings in the city, not just our baseline control areas. Again the results are similar, suggesting that
our choice of control areas is not driving our results.46 Panels E-G repeat the comparisons of Panels
B-D but this time for upgrading areas, and again the results are similar to those described for Panel
A.47
Though the differences in residential quality that we document are economically large and statis-
tically significant, a lingering concern is that these differences might be affected by different owner-
ship patterns between de novo, upgrading, and control neighborhoods. Fortunately, the TSCP data
contain information on the ownership of building units. Building units can be thought of as houses
or apartments - some building units take up entire buildings (e.g. detached single family homes),
46Unfortunately it was impractical to try something similar with the imagery data, which were expensive to purchase
and process, and we could not afford to use them to cover entire cities.
47We also show that our findings are robust to using individual buildings rather than blocks of land (Appendix Table
A7) or using Conley standard errors (available on request).
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while others are subdivisions of buildings (e.g. apartments). We match to these building units to
the building level characteristics we analyzed above, and estimate regressions of the same specifica-
tion as (5), but this time at the building unit level. We note that owners of multiple housing units
overwhelmingly own a small number of units (the mean is 2.5).
The results in Panel A of Table 3 are similar to the building-level results in Panel A of Table 2.
In Panel B of Table 3 we add fixed effects for (anonymized) last names of owners, and although the
sample is cut by about half the results are largely unchanged.48 In Panel C we add fixed effects for
full owner name. The estimates remain similar and statistically significant, except for the sanitation
measure.49Taken together, these results indicate that while sorting of owners account for some of the
differences between de novo and control neighborhoods, they do not account for all the differences.
And of course, present day ownership is an outcome (this would have been the case even if the
treatment had been assigned in a randomized controlled trial), so even some of the attenuation that
we do find when controlling for full name fixed effects might be due to a "bad control" problem.
The main takeaway is that observed and unobserved differences in owner characteristics between
neighborhoods are unlikely to fully explain the quality gap that we document in favor of de novo
neighborhoods. This still leaves the possibility that the sorting of residents, as opposed to owners,
matters, and we return to this issue below.50
Having established that the higher quality of buildings in de novo areas is not driven entirely by
the selection of owners, we now examine another potential channel discussed in the model, namely
that de novo areas’ infrastructure persists better over time due to feedback from the (private) housing
quality to the infrastructure. While we do not have ideal data to study this question, we make a start
in Table 4 by looking at access to roads. Roads were provided in all Sites and Services neighborhoods,
although the task of constructing very local roads to connect to the main ones was apparently left to
the residents. Using the Worldview data and cleaned Openstreetmap data on roads, Table 4 shows
de novo areas are about 10 percentage points more likely (or roughly 66 percent more likely) to have
a road within 10 meters compared to the control areas. We find a similar pattern for the three TSCP
cities, where the survey data again indicate that de novo areas are significantly more likely to have
road access than the control areas.
In the last two columns we use connection to water mains as our outcome of interest. Again
the coefficient is large and positive when we look at all three cities, and when we look at Mbeya
and Mwanza, where we know that water mains connection were provided to both de novo and
upgrading areas.
48To be precise, we consider a full name (last name) as different if it appears in more than one city. In practice this does
not seem to make much difference.
49The number of units is roughly halved because in Panel B we drop buildings with unique owner last names. It roughly
halves for the same reason as we move from Panel B to Panel C. Comparing the results in Panel C to those using the same
sample (not reported) shows a drop of about one third in the Z-index when we include full name fixed effects in the same
sample.
50As a robustness check, we re-estimate the same specification but this time weighting by the inverse number of building
units per building (Appendix Table A8) or using Conley standard errors (results available on request from the authors),
and in both cases the results are similar.
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Table 4 also shows that the estimates for upgrading areas are similar to those of the control ar-
eas. This may reflect low persistence of water and road investments in upgrading areas, though we
cannot rule out that similar investments were also carried out in the control areas. As we mention
above, though, we have direct evidence from Kironde (1994) on poor survival rates of infrastructure
in at least one upgrading neighborhood in Dar es Salaam.51
In addition to the study of persistence of infrastructure, another question we examine is whether
there is a difference in outcomes between the First Round of Sites and Services, which included more
infrastructure investment than the Second Round. We therefore estimate equation (5) again, but we
now allow for the effect of de novo and upgrading to vary by round. The results, reported in Table 5,
show that buildings in First-Round de novo neighborhoods look much better than the rest - they are
the largest, the most likely to be near roads, and the most regularly organized. Next come the Second
Round de novo buildings, which overall do not look significantly different from those in the control
areas, although these areas are still more regular and less empty than the control areas. In contrast,
the buildings in the upgrading areas look worse for both rounds. Interestingly, even the First Round
upgrading areas do not look particularly well, even though they received more investments than the
Second Round de novo areas. In fact, First Round upgrading areas look even worse than those in
the Second Round of upgrading. One way to rationalize this finding is to go back to Appendix Table
A3, which shows that they are currently more densely populated (almost 31,000 people per square
kilometer in First Round upgrading compared to around 19,000 people per square kilometer in Sec-
ond Round upgrading). We conjecture that people are willing to live in these cramped conditions
to benefit from proximity to employment, since much of the first round of upgrading took place in
Dar es Salaam. In a robustness check (Appendix Table A10) we report building-level results, which
are similar but suggest that Second Round de novo buildings may be larger than those in the control
areas. Taken together, our findings suggest that the size of the investment makes a big difference,
although even the modest investments in the Second Round lead to more intensive use of land for
residential use, and possibly larger buildings.52
A related question is whether the effect that we find from de novo neighborhoods varies much
by city. In Appendix Table A11 we re-estimate equation (5) using the Worldview data, but this time
allowing for the effects of de novo and upgrading neighborhoods to vary by city. The results show
that de novo areas generally do better in Dar es Salaam (which is by far the largest of the cities),
and in most respects also in Mbeya, and Mwanza. In Iringa de novo areas have larger buildings
and less empty areas, but in most respects they are similar to the control areas. In Morogoro and
Tabora the de novo areas are similar to the controls, but more built up. In Tanga they are statistically
indistinguishable from the control areas in all the measures we have.53
51Appendix Table A9 repeats the same analysis using building level data, with similar results; the results are again
similar when we use Conley s.e. (results available upon request).
52As before, our results are robust to using Conley standard errors.
53As mentioned above, we have some uncertainty over the extent of infrastructure that was actually provided. It is
also worth noting that the three cities where de novo areas look best compared to control areas, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya,
and Mwanza, were also the fastest growing of the seven cities we study from 1988-2002, and the largest at the end of this
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The upgrading areas look denser than the control areas in most cities, and their housing quality
is worse overall in five of the six cities. The only exception is Iringa, where upgrading areas look
similar to control and de novo areas.
Since we find that de novo neighborhoods enjoy, at least on average, better residential quality, it
is natural to ask to what extent this translates into higher land values. To address this question we
use data from the Tanzania Ministry of Lands (2012) to estimate land values in Sites and Services
neighborhoods in Dar es Salaam. The data we have contain verbal and often imprecise descriptions
of locations within cities. Nevertheless, these data suggest that the mean land value in that city’s de
novo neighborhoods is in the range of $160-220 per square meter, while in its upgrading neighbor-
hoods it is about 2017 US$30-40 per square meter. These values are large compared to the cost of
investments per unit of treated plot area which we estimate above to be no more than $8 per square
meter of plot area (in 2017 USD). While these data should be interpreted with caution, they suggest
that the gains from de novo investments were large, at least in Dar es Salaam. We interpret this as
broadly consistent with Scenario 4 of the model, where feedback from housing quality to infrastruc-
ture quality magnifies the long run gains from de novo investments. That said, we acknowledge that
the picture for other cities might differ, because Dar es Salaam has both high land values and large
estimated gains from de novo (see Appendix Table A11) compared to other cities.54
The next step in our analysis is to examine the sorting of residents into the de novo, control, and
upgrading areas. Our findings that de novo areas have better housing quality and (at least in Dar es
Salaam) much higher land prices suggests that those who can afford to live in them would be richer.
Our best proxy for lifetime income in the 2012 census data are measures of schooling. In Table 6
we report regression estimates using specification (5), but this time using schooling measures as the
dependent variable. As discussed above, the units of observation here are (cut) enumeration areas
that fall entirely within de novo, upgrading, or control areas. These are available for all seven cities.
Table 6 shows that adult heads of household (and adults overall) in de novo neighborhoods have
about two years of schooling more than those in control areas, while those in upgrading areas have
about 0.2-0.6 fewer years of schooling than those in control areas (the estimates for upgrading areas
are not all precise).55 The estimates are similar when we use entire cities as control areas (instead
of our baseline control areas).56 The sorting patterns are again quite similar when we restrict the
analysis to Dar es Salaam (results available upon request). Table A12 repeats the analysis using
weights reflecting the proportion of the cut EA piece that lies inside each treatment or control area
multiplied by the number of people (adult head of households for columns 1-3, adults for columns
period. It is possible that de novo neighborhoods are particularly beneficial for large and growing cities, or that in those
cities areas that did not receive the de novo treatment became more congested. That said, our small sample of cities limits
our ability to draw firm conclusions.
54Unfortunately, our land value data for other cities are either missing or not detailed enough to give a credible picture.
55The regressions in Table 6 are weighted using each cut EA’s share of the total area in the EA. In practice this weighting
makes little difference.
56Since the cut EAs are generally larger than the blocks we study above and often span treatment area boundaries, we do
not attempt to replicate the analysis in the close vicinity of the boundaries between de novo and control areas or upgrading
and control areas.
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4-6) contributing to the EA mean of the outcome variable. Once again the results are similar.
If we take the usual estimates of the returns to schooling around the world, which translate each
additional year of schooling into approximately 10 percent higher earnings (e.g. Montenegro and Pa-
trino 2014), the difference in earnings potential between residents of de novo and upgrading neigh-
borhoods in Dar es Salaam account for little of the roughly five-fold difference in land values. This
suggests that early investments (de novo) yield considerable gains over and above those reflected by
individuals’ sorting.
This can be further seen in Table A13, where we estimate the same specification as the first five
columns of Table 1 but this time using cut EAs as units of analysis, with the same weights as in Table
A12.57 The results in Panel A are similar to those in Table 1. In Panel B we control for the years of
schooling of adults in each cut EA. The coefficients on schooling are positive and significant, but the
estimated housing quality advantage of de novo declines only marginally, and remains positive and
significant in most cases.
Another way to look at the schooling differences is to consider how they reflect different shares
of the adult population with more than primary school education. This group accounts for approx-
imately 58 percent of adults in de novo neighborhoods, 38 percent in control neighborhoods, and
36 percent in upgrading neighborhoods. This suggests that despite significant sorting, more than 40
percent of adults in de novo neighborhoods had no more than primary school education. And as
mentioned above, even conditional on their schooling, those living in de novo neighborhoods bene-
fit from better housing. Furthermore, even less educated people who initially owned de novo plots
and eventually sold them, likely gained from some of the land value appreciation.58 Together, these
findings indicate that the de novo neighborhoods provide benefits even for those with lower levels
of education.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines consequences of different strategies for developing basic infrastructure for res-
idential neighborhoods. Specifically, we study the Sites and Services projects in 24 neighborhoods
in seven Tanzanian cities during the 1970s and 1980s. These projects provided basic infrastructure,
leaving it to the residents to build their own homes. We examine the long run development of these
neighborhoods, emphasizing the comparison between de novo neighborhoods and other nearby ar-
eas that were greenfields when the Sites and Services program started. We also provide descriptive
evidence on the development of upgrading neighborhoods.
We develop a simple quantitative model that allows us to examine the implications of early in-
vestments. The model shows that in the presence of complementarity between infrastructure and
57One difference is that upgrading areas look a bit better than the control areas when we aggregate to the coarser cut EA
level.
58As we discuss in Section 4, a few years after Sites and Services were implemented, most of the residents in de novo
neighborhoods in Dar es Salaam were still those targeted by the policy, many of whom were poor.
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housing quality, early investment in infrastructure both prevents waste and can lead to better hous-
ing quality in the long run. But early investment, even when coupled with differences in household
income and credit constraints that work against upgrading neighborhoods, cannot explain large long
run differences in housing quality and land values in our baseline model. Even if early infrastruc-
ture investment improves property rights protection, it still cannot account for large and persistent
differences in these outcomes when houses get replaced quite often, as seems to be the case in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In contrast, one mechanism that can lead to large differences in housing quality
and land prices in the long run is feedback from the quality of private homes back to infrastructure
quality.
We then use satellite images and survey data to study housing quality and infrastructure in the
affected neighborhoods and their vicinity. We find that the de novo neighborhoods developed much
better housing than other nearby areas, while the upgrading neighborhoods did not. Our findings
are robust to focusing on a narrow area close to the boundary between de novo and control areas. In
the case of the three cities for which we have survey data, we find similar effects when we control
for owner fixed effects. The differences in quality between de novo and upgrading are particularly
pronounced in the First Round, where the de novo investments were larger. We also find that in Dar
es Salaam, differences in land values between de novo and upgrading neighborhoods are sizeable.
We document the sorting patterns across neighborhoods in the long run, and show that more ed-
ucated workers eventually sorted into the de novo neighborhoods, where housing quality is higher.
But we also show that over 40 percent of the adult residents in de novo neighborhoods have no
more than primary school education. Moreover, the differences in schooling can account for little of
the differences in land values that we find in Dar es Salaam. Finally, we show that across all seven
cities, accounting for residents’ schooling levels explains little of the housing quality differences. This
suggests that at least some less-educated people benefitted considerably from the de novo develop-
ments. And even among those who eventually sold the land, we report suggestive evidence that
they likely gained from at least some of the land value appreciation.
That does not mean that the story of Sites and Services in Tanzania is entirely rosy. The upgrading
neighborhoods presently look a bit worse (and much denser) than nearby areas, though admittedly
they may have looked even worse without the Sites and Services investments. Our findings do not
imply that upgrading slums is futile. Informal neighborhoods provide an affordable entry point for
poor people who often migrate from rural areas or locations of conflict, and their high population
density means that their infrastructure can serve many people at once. But in order to provide long
lasting benefits, upgrading programs should aim to do better than the Sites and Services program.
Specifically, our paper suggests preventing the deterioration of infrastructure in those areas is impor-
tant.
As we discuss above, our findings suggest that de novo neighborhoods provide important bene-
fits, including for less educated people. At the same time, we also report (in Section 4) evidence that
the very poorest residents were excluded from these neighborhoods because they could not afford
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to pay. Designing de novo projects that are more affordable for the poor, perhaps with smaller plot
sizes, seems like a policy that merits further consideration.
Our findings also suggest that, at least for de novo neighborhoods, larger early investments lead
to higher quality neighborhoods in the long run, since in the long run owners complement invest-
ments in better infrastructure (such as water supply) with more investments in private housing.
Taken together, our findings suggest that de novo infrastructure investments may be a useful
policy tool for growing African cities. These investments are cheaper than building homes, so they
impose less financial burden on poor governments. They also offer important advantages to resi-
dents, who can plan their homes accordingly, and invest in higher quality housing that can persist
for decades. Our findings also suggest that it is important to ensure that the infrastructure invest-
ments are sustainable, and do not depreciate as a result of poor private investments. While the im-
plementation of Sites and Services projects in Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s was far from flawless,
these projects taught us important lessons. We hope that these lessons can inform future planning
and investment decisions in a continent that is growing in both population and income per capita,
but where many poor people still live in poor quality buildings and neighborhoods.
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Main Tables
Table 1: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using Imagery Data for all Seven Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean
log
building
footprint
area
Share of
buildings
with
painted
roof
Share of
buildings
with no
neighbor
within 1m
Mean
similarity
of
building
orien-
tation
Z-index
Empty
block
indicator
Share of
area
built up
Number
of buildings
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Baseline Control Areas
De novo 0.312 0.037 0.024 2.509 0.263 -0.131 0.047 -0.947
(0.040) (0.011) (0.027) (0.382) (0.038) (0.024) (0.012) (0.430)
Upgrading -0.066 -0.035 -0.165 0.097 -0.175 -0.223 0.148 4.160
(0.036) (0.008) (0.022) (0.258) (0.031) (0.021) (0.011) (0.398)
Obs. 17,682 17,573 17,682 17,682 17,682 21,602 21,602 21,602
Mean (control) 4.392 0.134 0.502 -8.001 -0.000 0.288 0.184 5.066
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within 500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.126 0.002 -0.110 2.842 0.075 -0.163 0.093 1.487
(0.036) (0.011) (0.024) (0.501) (0.037) (0.029) (0.012) (0.347)
Obs. 6,476 6,411 6,476 6,476 6,476 8,547 8,547 8,547
Mean (control) 4.480 0.155 0.566 -8.702 0.075 0.322 0.150 3.476
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within 250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.117 0.004 -0.071 2.809 0.099 -0.171 0.092 1.408
(0.040) (0.012) (0.023) (0.569) (0.038) (0.032) (0.012) (0.349)
Obs. 3,899 3,865 3,899 3,899 3,899 5,116 5,116 5,116
Mean (control) 4.519 0.170 0.544 -8.736 0.090 0.329 0.150 3.474
Panel D: Upgrading and Control Areas within 500m of Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.042 -0.024 -0.119 -0.032 -0.125 -0.196 0.125 3.410
(0.035) (0.007) (0.020) (0.262) (0.028) (0.022) (0.011) (0.376)
Obs. 10,747 10,683 10,747 10,747 10,747 12,854 12,854 12,854
Mean (control) 4.361 0.118 0.464 -7.317 -0.031 0.253 0.208 6.044
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas within 250m of Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.051 -0.017 -0.099 0.104 -0.102 -0.176 0.103 2.891
(0.036) (0.007) (0.022) (0.289) (0.028) (0.025) (0.012) (0.376)
Obs. 6,652 6,618 6,652 6,652 6,652 7,855 7,855 7,855
Mean (control) 4.356 0.114 0.469 -7.468 -0.040 0.243 0.213 6.196
Notes: Regressions of block level observations with outcomes derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and Services cities. The outcomes are measures
of complementarity between the treatment and private investment. Each observation is a block based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters. Outcomes are
derived from the set of buildings with a centroid in the block. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Blocks are assigned to either
upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their
parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, a fixed effect for Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and the
distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares.
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Table 2: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using TSCP Survey Data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean
log
building
footprint
area
Share of
buildings
with
multiple
storeys
Share of
buildings
with
a good roof
Share of
buildings
connected to
electricity
Share of
buildings
with sewerage
or septic
tank
Z-index
Empty
block
indicator
Share
of
built up
area
Number
of
buildings
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Baseline Control Areas
De novo 0.456 0.114 -0.003 0.296 0.195 0.461 -0.138 0.110 0.715
(0.055) (0.054) (0.008) (0.035) (0.049) (0.058) (0.041) (0.014) (0.304)
Upgrading -0.128 -0.088 -0.095 -0.076 -0.099 -0.344 -0.178 0.091 2.342
(0.090) (0.027) (0.034) (0.049) (0.053) (0.104) (0.042) (0.018) (0.447)
Obs. 3,813 3,583 3,810 3,813 3,804 3,813 4,959 4,959 4,959
Mean (control) 4.801 0.092 0.975 0.464 0.352 -0.000 0.289 0.127 2.549
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within 500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.469 0.096 -0.002 0.270 0.188 0.438 -0.130 0.113 0.864
(0.057) (0.055) (0.006) (0.041) (0.049) (0.064) (0.037) (0.015) (0.280)
Obs. 2,031 1,995 2,031 2,031 2,028 2,031 2,715 2,715 2,715
Mean (control) 4.782 0.099 0.981 0.468 0.389 0.030 0.300 0.104 2.012
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within 250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.451 0.072 -0.003 0.238 0.178 0.388 -0.139 0.104 0.847
(0.060) (0.067) (0.008) (0.050) (0.059) (0.080) (0.044) (0.016) (0.276)
Obs. 1,223 1,203 1,223 1,223 1,220 1,223 1,644 1,644 1,644
Mean (control) 4.766 0.145 0.983 0.479 0.382 0.064 0.322 0.100 1.926
Panel D: De novo and Entire City Control Areas
De novo 0.465 0.118 0.018 0.345 0.202 0.529 -0.359 0.152 1.637
(0.046) (0.051) (0.008) (0.033) (0.044) (0.057) (0.039) (0.015) (0.223)
Obs. 23,173 22,126 23,146 23,173 23,037 23,173 42,409 42,409 42,409
Mean (control) 4.876 0.110 0.946 0.488 0.399 0.022 0.461 0.096 1.707
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas within 500m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.166 -0.082 -0.100 -0.093 -0.121 -0.380 -0.156 0.078 2.123
(0.094) (0.025) (0.035) (0.051) (0.055) (0.108) (0.044) (0.019) (0.470)
Obs. 2,062 1,851 2,059 2,062 2,056 2,062 2,583 2,583 2,583
Mean (control) 4.864 0.098 0.970 0.522 0.347 0.042 0.246 0.163 3.275
Panel F: Upgrading and Control Areas within 250m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.157 -0.092 -0.126 -0.108 -0.164 -0.461 -0.162 0.075 1.874
(0.105) (0.031) (0.044) (0.057) (0.057) (0.135) (0.053) (0.022) (0.528)
Obs. 1,189 1,069 1,188 1,189 1,185 1,189 1,515 1,515 1,515
Mean (control) 4.808 0.127 0.967 0.499 0.379 0.043 0.270 0.152 3.309
Panel G: Upgrading Areas and Entire City Control Areas
Upgrading -0.220 -0.141 -0.080 -0.107 -0.122 -0.411 -0.301 0.123 3.252
(0.078) (0.021) (0.035) (0.047) (0.039) (0.091) (0.041) (0.020) (0.420)
Obs. 23,090 21,977 23,063 23,090 22,956 23,090 42,251 42,251 42,251
Mean (control) 4.876 0.110 0.946 0.488 0.399 0.022 0.461 0.096 1.707
Notes: Regressions of block level observations with outcomes derived from TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga. The outcomes are measures of
complementarity between the treatment and private investment. Each observation is a block based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters. Outcomes are derived
from the set of buildings with a centroid in the block. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Blocks are assigned to either
upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their
parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares. Panels E and G display results for the sample of blocks covering the whole city
excluding upgrading and de novo areas respectively.
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Table 3: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using TSCP Survey Data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga with Owner Name Fixed
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log
building
footprint
area
Multistorey
building
Good
roof
Connected
to
electricity
Sewerage or
septic tank
Z-index
Panel A: Baseline Model without Name Fixed Effects
De novo 0.613 0.190 -0.022 0.355 0.219 0.502
(0.078) (0.086) (0.018) (0.028) (0.050) (0.055)
Upgrading -0.009 -0.117 -0.044 0.029 -0.061 -0.136
(0.094) (0.033) (0.020) (0.052) (0.039) (0.070)
Obs. 23,921 20,351 23,858 23,921 23,627 23,921
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Panel B: Owner Last Name Fixed Effects
De novo 0.798 0.191 -0.043 0.402 0.260 0.568
(0.072) (0.107) (0.021) (0.032) (0.061) (0.065)
Upgrading 0.049 -0.158 -0.035 0.066 -0.028 -0.097
(0.082) (0.050) (0.015) (0.050) (0.031) (0.065)
Obs. 11,122 8,698 11,082 11,122 10,899 11,122
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Panel C: Owner Full Name Fixed Effects
De novo 0.545 0.180 0.022 0.249 0.035 0.419
(0.113) (0.101) (0.043) (0.089) (0.109) (0.135)
Upgrading -0.008 -0.053 -0.008 0.309 0.025 0.078
(0.109) (0.052) (0.027) (0.079) (0.081) (0.082)
Obs. 6,493 4,655 6,457 6,493 6,311 6,493
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Notes: Regressions of unit level observations with outcomes derived from TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga. The outcomes are measures of
complementarity between the treatment and private investment. Each observation is a unit in a building. Outcomes are measured at the building level. The
z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Units are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their building’s
centroid falls. Each specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included
are fixed effects for each city and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter
grid squares. Panel A displays results for the full sample of units inside de novo, upgrading, and baseline control areas. Panel B displays results adding unit
owner last name fixed effects and further restricting the sample by dropping singletons; keeping only last name owners that appear more than once in the
sample. Panel C displays results adding owner full (first and last) name fixed effects and further restricting the sample by dropping singletons; keeping only full
name owners that appear more than once in the sample.
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Table 4: De novo and Upgrading Regressions on Persistence Measures using Imagery and TSCP Survey Data
Imagery TSCP Survey
TSCP Survey,
Mbeya and Mwanza Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share
of buildings
with road
within
10m
Share of
buildings
with
road access
Share of
buildings
connected to
water
mains
Share of
buildings
connected to
water
mains
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and
Baseline Control Areas
De novo 0.102 0.190 0.277 0.300
(0.017) (0.048) (0.035) (0.036)
Upgrading 0.024 -0.002 -0.063 -0.045
(0.010) (0.038) (0.048) (0.057)
Obs. 17,682 3,811 3,813 3,305
Mean (control) 0.154 0.605 0.527 0.467
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within
500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.124 0.228 0.239 0.264
(0.020) (0.055) (0.041) (0.043)
Obs. 6,476 2,030 2,031 1,858
Mean (control) 0.170 0.475 0.540 0.495
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within
250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.112 0.207 0.225 0.247
(0.023) (0.060) (0.042) (0.044)
Obs. 3,899 1,223 1,223 1,124
Mean (control) 0.170 0.479 0.544 0.506
Panel D: Upgrading and Control Areas within
500m of Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.009 -0.025 -0.067 -0.042
(0.011) (0.038) (0.052) (0.062)
Obs. 10,747 2,060 2,062 1,617
Mean (control) 0.159 0.768 0.579 0.485
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas within
250m of Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.002 -0.016 -0.097 -0.065
(0.011) (0.046) (0.055) (0.072)
Obs. 6,652 1,187 1,189 879
Mean (control) 0.155 0.783 0.567 0.445
Notes: Regressions of block level observations with outcomes derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and Services cities (road within 10m) and TSCP
survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga (road access and connection to water mains). The outcomes are measures of persistence of treatment. Each
observation is a block based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters. Outcomes are derived from the set of buildings with a centroid in the block. Blocks are
assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator
with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, a fixed effect for Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and
the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares.
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Table 5: De novo and Upgrading Regressions for Rounds 1 and 2 using Imagery Data for all Seven Cities
Mean
log
building
footprint
area
Share of
buildings
with no
neighbor
within 1m
Mean
similarity
of
building
orien-
tation
Share
of buildings
with road
within
10m
Z-index
(including
roads)
Empty
block
indicator
Share of
area
built up
Number
of buildings
De novo 1 0.372 0.042 3.082 0.137 0.378 -0.066 0.040 -1.532
(0.051) (0.034) (0.450) (0.022) (0.043) (0.029) (0.016) (0.599)
De novo 2 0.041 -0.110 1.556 0.015 -0.015 -0.209 0.079 1.677
(0.043) (0.034) (0.814) (0.015) (0.031) (0.046) (0.018) (0.394)
Upgrading 1 -0.208 -0.270 0.734 0.029 -0.211 -0.128 0.171 6.028
(0.059) (0.034) (0.304) (0.018) (0.042) (0.024) (0.018) (0.747)
Upgrading 2 0.025 -0.096 -0.400 0.017 -0.071 -0.282 0.133 2.993
(0.039) (0.024) (0.389) (0.011) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.368)
Obs. 17,682 17,682 17,682 17,682 17,682 21,602 21,602 21,602
Mean (control) 4.392 0.502 -8.001 0.154 -0.000 0.288 0.184 5.066
Notes: Regressions of block level observations with outcomes derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and Services cities. The outcomes are measures
of complementarity between the treatment and private investment. Each observation is a block based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters. Outcomes are
derived from the set of buildings with a centroid in the block. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Blocks are assigned to either
upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes de novo round 1, de novo round 2, upgrading round 1, and
upgrading round 2 indicators with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, a fixed effect for Temeke
district in Dar es Salaam, and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid
squares.
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Table 6: De novo and Upgrading Regressions of Education using 2012 Census Data
Adult Heads of Household All Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of
schooling
Exactly
primary
school
More than
primary
school
Years of
schooling
Exactly
primary
school
More than
primary
school
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Control
De novo 2.265 -0.227 0.272 2.011 -0.192 0.239
(0.279) (0.029) (0.035) (0.251) (0.026) (0.032)
Upgrading -0.335 0.000 -0.030 -0.238 -0.002 -0.020
(0.227) (0.025) (0.030) (0.201) (0.024) (0.027)
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520
Mean (control) 8.320 0.532 0.352 8.509 0.515 0.378
Panel B: De novo, Upgrading and Entire City Control Areas
De novo 2.124 -0.241 0.264 1.932 -0.206 0.234
(0.166) (0.023) (0.022) (0.142) (0.019) (0.019)
Upgrading -0.628 0.043 -0.069 -0.562 0.048 -0.069
(0.083) (0.010) (0.010) (0.078) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 18,552 18,552 18,552 18,553 18,553 18,553
Mean (control) 8.451 0.523 0.365 8.592 0.506 0.389
Notes: Regressions of cut Enumeration Area (EA) level observations with outcomes derived from Tanzania 2012 Census microdata for all seven Sites and
Services cities. The outcomes are measures of sorting into the treatment and control areas. Each observation is a cut EA of varying size. Outcomes are the EA
mean over the set of either heads of household at least 18 years old (columns 1-3) or all adults at least 18 years old (columns 4-6) enumerated in the EA. Cut
EAs are assigned to upgrading, de novo, and/or control areas if more than 5% of the cut EA lies inside the respective area. Analytic weights for the cut EA
observations used in the regression are based on the proportion of the EA area that lies inside each treatment or control area. Each specification includes a de
novo and an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, fixed effects for
Temeke and Ilala districts in Dar es Salaam, and fixed effects for the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares. Panel B displays results for the sample of EAs covering the whole city; all EAs classified as urban within the
same administrative area as the relevant treatment areas.
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This data appendix is organized as follows. We begin with a short description of the background
for the Sites and Services projects and a discussion of how the de novo plots were allocated. We then
explain how we measure the treatment and control areas in the different cities. We then describe
the three main datasets: the first comes from imagery data; the second from the Tanzania Strategic
Cities Project Survey (TSCP); and the third comes from Tanzanian census micro data. Finally, we
discuss other auxiliary datasets, including additional census data (at a coarser level of aggregation);
land values data; data on project costs; population data for 2002; Finally, we explain how we make
currency conversions.
Project Background and treatment
Background
The Sites and Services projects took place in seven Tanzanian cities. Twelve de novo areas (greenfield
investments) and twelve slum upgrading areas (upgraded squatter settlements). The project was
rolled out in two rounds - the first in 1974-1977 and the second 1977-1984. In the First Round, the
World Bank treated the northwest of Dar es Salaam (Kinondoni) and Mbeya with both de novo
and upgrading and Mwanza with de novo investment only. In the Second Round the two types
of treatment took place in the southeast of Dar es Salaam (Temeke), Tanga, Tabora, Morogoro and
Iringa. The number of de novo and upgrading plot surveyed in each round is reported in Appendix
Table A4. Both stages included investments in roads and roadside drainage (open earth ditches)
along them and a mix of public buildings (typically schools, dispensaries and health centers). In
some cases street lights near the public buildings were also provided. Round 1 areas and Round 2
upgrading areas (but not Round 2 de novo areas) also benefitted from water mains.
Allocation of de novo plots
Plots were allocated to beneficiaries according whose i) houses were demolished in the upgrading
areas ii) income was in the range of 400-1000 Tanzanian shilling (Tsh) a month. The income range
was meant to target the 20th-60th percentiles of countrywide incomes (Kironde, 1991). According
to project completion reports (World Bank, 1984 and World Bank, 1987), between 50% and 70% of
all project beneficiaries belonged to the target population. There was some evidence (World Bank,
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1987) that a number of more affluent individuals obtained some of the plots after they had not been
developed by initial beneficiaries.
Selection of Treatment and Control Areas
We use a variety of historical maps, satellite and aerial photos to define the exact boundaries of
treatment. For Dar, Iringa, Tabora, Tanga, and Morogoro, the World Bank Project Appraisals (World
Bank, 1974a and World Bank, 1977b) provided maps of the planned boundaries of the upgrading and
de novo sites. In Dar, two maps were available, from 1974 and 1977, differing slightly for Mikocheni
area. For all areas except Tandika and Mtoni, we chose to use the 1974 map, as it appeared more
precise in following the terrain and the roads. However, for Tandika and Mtoni we had to use the
1977 map, because these areas were part of the Second Round which was not included in the earlier
1974 map.
For the two remaining cities, Mbeya and Mwanza, the maps from the project appraisal were not
available. Therefore, for Mbeya we asked three experts to draw the boundaries of treatment. These
experts were Anna Mtani and Shaoban Sheuya from Ardhi University, who both worked on the first
round of Sites and Services project, and Amulike Mahenge from the Ministry of Land, who was the
Municipal Director in Mbeya.
To delineate the treatment areas in Mwanza we obtained cadastral maps dating back to 1973 from
the city municipality. Since in Mwanza the treatment included only de novo plots, the cadastral map
was sufficient to get the information for the intended treatment areas. We define the treatment area
as covering the numbered plots that were of a size that (approximately) fitted the project descriptions
(288 square meters); we also include public buildings into the treatment areas, to be consistent with
the procedure in other cities. This procedure gives us a comprehensive picture of the twelve de novo
and twelve upgrading neighborhoods across all seven cities.
To define our control areas, along with the historical World Bank maps from the Appraisal reports
(World Bank, 1974a and World Bank, 1977b), we use historical topographic maps, and satellite and
aerial images taken just before the dates of the treatment. We assign all undeveloped ("greenfield")
land within 500 meters of any treatment border to our set of control areas. However, as we explain
in more detail below, we exclude areas that were either designated for non-residential use, or that
were developed prior to treatment, or that are uninhabitable. Our rationale for looking at greenfield
areas as controls because we want a clear counterfactual for the de novo areas. We have no “nat-
ural” counterfactual for the upgraded squatter areas, because we do not observe untreated squatter
areas in the vicinity. The 500 meter cut-off reduces the risk of substantial heterogeneity in locational
fundamentals. As part of our analysis we also focus on areas that are even closer to the boundaries
between areas.
In order to know what had been previously developed, we used any historical maps or imagery
as close to the treatment date as we could find. We used all planned treatment maps. These include
the 1974 and 1977 maps for Dar es Salaam and the 1977 maps for Morogoro, Iringa, Tanga and Tabora
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(World Bank 1987); the 1973 cadastral map of Mwanza (Mwanza City Municipality, 1973); satellite
images from 1966 (United States Geological Survey 2015); aerial imagery from 1978 for Tabora and
topographic maps from 1967 1974, and 1978 for Tabora, Iringa and Morogoro (Directorate of Overseas
Surveys 2015). All areas (with some minor exceptions described below) were covered by at least one
source. Satellite images and maps also confirm that the areas designated as de novo were indeed
unbuilt before the Sites and Services program was implemented.
We use all these data to determine which areas within 500 meter of Sites and Services areas to
exclude from our baseline control group. Our rules for exclusion from the control areas are as fol-
lows. First, we exclude areas that were planned for non-residential use. These were indicated on
the planned treatment map for industrial or governmental use. Second, we exclude areas that were
developed before the Sites and Services projects began. These were either indicated as houses or
industrial areas on topographic maps, or visibly built in the historical satellite images. Third, we ex-
clude uninhabitable areas, for example, those off the coast. Finally, in the case of Mwanza (where we
had to infer the treatment areas) we applied additional criteria for exclusion. In this case we exclude
large numbered plots and all unnumbered plots, which do not seem to fit the description of de novo
plots. We also exclude areas where the treatment areas are truncated at the edge, since we do not
know where the exact boundary of treatment is. In this case we drew rectangles perpendicular to the
map edge where the treatment area is truncated, and exclude the area within them.59 Further details
on defining exclusion areas are outlined in Table A14.
Thus, our treatment maps show upgrading, de novo and control areas, as well as excluded areas.
Moreover, with these appropriately defined control areas net of excluded locations, we can analyze
present day outcomes using boundaries between control areas and de novo areas, and between con-
trol areas and upgrading areas.
Dataset 1: Imagery data
Buildings
To study the quality of housing we use Worldview satellite images (DigitalGlobe 2016), which pro-
vide grayscale data at resolution of approximately 0.5 meters along with multispectral data at a
resolution of approximately 2.5 meters. 60 We employed a company (Ramani Geosystems) to trace
out the building footprints from these data for six of the seven cities. For the final city, Dar es Salaam,
we used building outlines from a different, freely available, source - Dar Ramani Huria (2016).
We derive the following indicators of building quality using the building outlines: the logarithm
of building footprint, the distance between each building and its neighbor, building orientation rel-
59We include in the baseline control areas (minor) areas where there is no pre-treatment data, because they are very
sparse and are located near other empty areas.
60The images were taken at different dates: Iringa (2013), Mbeya (2014), Morogoro (2012), Mwanza (2014), Tabora (2011),
Tanga (2012) and there are two separate images for two districts in Dar es Salaam: Kinondoni (2015) and Temeke(2014)
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ative to its neighbors and, finally the distance to the nearest road using ArcGIS tools. Details on the
derivation of these variables are described in Appendix Table A15.
We use two different approaches to analyze the data: building level outcomes and outcomes at
the level of 50 x 50 meter blocks. For building level outcomes each variable is simply the measure for
that given building. For grid cell outcomes we average each measure and indicator to get averages
and shares. To do that, we begin with an arbitrary grid of 50 x 50 meter blocks. If a block is divided
between de novo, upgrading, and control areas, we attribute the cell to the area where its centroid
lies. Finally, we match into each cell the buildings whose centroids fall within it. This allows us to
additionally measure three variables: the share of built up area in the cell, the count of buildings in a
cell and whether the cell is empty. These variable descriptions are summarized in Table A15.
Roofs
To study the quality of roofs, we use the same Worldview satellite images as we did for the build-
ing outcomes above. The objective is to separate painted roofs (which are less prone to rust) from
unpainted tin roofs (rusted or not), in order to get a measure for roof quality that captures more
variation than the TSCP survey indicator for good roofs. The cut-off between painted and unpainted
roofs was chosen also because we had evidence from our initial field investigation that the painted
roofs are considerably more expensive.
To this end, we create an algorithm through which ArcGIS and Python can separate painted from
unpainted roofs for each satellite image of the seven Sites and Services cities. Before running the
algorithm, we created unique color bins which would identify each type of roof material. These bins
are three-dimensional sections of the red-green-blue space that correspond to different colors, which
we think of as either painted roofs (e.g. painted red, green, blue 61) or unpainted ones (e.g. tin,
rusted, and bright tin 62). We defined the bins through a process of sampling pixels from each roof
material type, identifying the color bins to which the pixels belong, and iteratively narrowing the
bins for each roof type until they were mutually exclusive. Since each satellite image was slightly
different in terms of sharpness, brightness and saturation, we sampled pixels from each image and
created city-specific bands.
The algorithm is then applied to each city with its unique color bins. The algorithm works by
reading the values of the color spectrum for red, green and blue of each pixel of a roof, and comparing
these values to the above-mentioned unique bands of the color spectrum identifying painted, rusted
and tin roofs. We assign to each roof the color bin that contains the plurality of pixels, and this
indicates whether we classify it as a painted roof or not.
61Apart from red, green and blue we also had a bin for brown painted roofs in Kinondoni, since only in that image
we noticed a large number of painted roofs that had a brown color, either due to image particularities or geographically
varying preferences for brown painted roofs.
62In Iringa and Mwanza we did not have the category bright tin since the particularities of the image or the conditions
of the day when the image was taken resulted in other roofs than tin also being very bright in these cities.
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Roads
For all seven cities we used road data from Openstreetmap (2017). We had to clean these data in
some locations using ArcGIS and Python, so that we only use roads that seem wide enough for a
single car to pass through (we eliminated "roads" between buildings that were less than one meter
apart). Following this automated procedure, we cleaned the road data manually to identify roads
that appear passable to a single car.
Dataset 2: Tanzanian Strategic Cities Project Survey
For three cities, Mbeya (in southwest Tanzania), Tanga (in northeast Tanzania), and Mwanza (in
northwest Tanzania) we have detailed building-level data from the Tanzanian Strategic Cities Project
(TSCP) which is a World Bank project implemented by the Prime Minister’s Office of Regional Ad-
ministration and Local Government (World Bank 2010). These surveys were carried out by the Tan-
zanian government from 2010-2013. We use these data to build a more detailed picture of building
quality in the areas we study.
The data arrived in raw format, with multiple duplicated records of each building and unit and
many of these duplicate observations with missing data. We used the following ruled to identify the
unique observations. Buildings are identified by ‘Building Reference Numbers’ (BRN) and building
units by BRN-units.
Rules for Excluding Buildings
1. Drop exact duplicates. i.e. if multiple buildings have all the same variables (including IDs)
only keep one of them (dropped 1,202,669 observations).
2. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN, drop all where all ‘variables of interest’
are missing. Variables of interest are an extensive list and comprise much more than what is
used in the analysis of this paper (dropped 166,131 observations).
3. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN, keep the observations with strictly more
non-missing variables of interest (dropped 12,842 observations).
4. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN, rank by ‘information provider’ and keep
the observations with a strictly higher rank (dropped 15,486 observations).
5. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN, for a set of observations with the same
BRN, replace with missing all variables where the records are inconsistent. For example, if
there are two observations with the same BRN and both have ‘2’ for number of stories there is
no inconsistency. But if one has ‘1’ number of rooms while the other has ‘2’: replace the number
of rooms with missing for both.
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6. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN all duplicate BRNs will have exactly the
same records, keep only one record for each BRN (dropped 27,483 observations).
7. There are no longer any duplicate BRNs. We drop 35,912 unique buildings from the records
that do not match a building in one of the city shapefiles of building footprints.
8. We drop 38,180 buildings from the records that are coded as outbuildings.
9. We drop 596 buildings that do not match to a unit.
10. Finally, we are left with 119,914 buildings all with at least one corresponding unit.
Rules for Excluding Building Units
1. Drop exact duplicates, for example, if multiple units have all the same variables (including IDs)
only keep one of them (dropped 1,288,430 observations).
2. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN-unit, drop all where all variables of interest
are missing. Variables of interest are an extensive list and comprise much more than what is
used in the analysis of this paper (dropped 221,134 observations).
3. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN-unit, keep the observations with strictly
more non-missing variables of interest (dropped 6,383 observations)
4. Of all remaining observations with a duplicate BRN-unit, for a set of observations with the
same BRN-unit, replace with missing all variables with mismatched records within the set. i.e.
if there are two observations with the same BRN-unit and both have ‘2’ for number of toilets:
do nothing, if one has ‘1’ number of rooms while the other has ‘2’: replace the number of rooms
with missing for both.
5. There are no longer any duplicate BRN-units. We drop 32,322 units from the records that do
not match a building in one of the city shapefiles of building footprints.
6. We drop 3,216 units from the records that are coded as outbuildings.
7. We do not need to drop any more units, since all remaining units match to a building.
8. Finally, we are left with 154,734 units all with a corresponding building.
From the building data set we exclude all buildings categorized as “Outbuildings” (sheds, garages,
and animal pens) from the analysis. This leaves us with a sample of buildings that are used mostly
for residential purposes, although a small fraction also serve commercial or public uses.
For these buildings in analysis we use the logarithm of building footprint; connection to elec-
tricity; connection to water mains; having at least basic sanitation (usually a septic tank and in rare
cases sewerage); having good (durable) roof materials; having more than one story; and having road
access. These variables and the explanation of how they are constructed are outlined in Table A16.
43
Rebuilding Rate
In addition to using TSCP data for the main analysis, we also use the TSCP data to calculate the rate
at which buildings are rebuilt, which we use in the model section. We use a dataset that includes the
construction year and latest rebuilding year for a sample of houses up to the year 2013.
In all three cities the default value for the "Year Built" and "Year Rebuilt" variables was apparently
2000, hence we had no way to distinguish whether the building was truly rebuilt in 2000, or the data
was missing. We therefore drop all observations with year 2000 for both of these variables from the
analysis and are left with 10% of total observations of buildings. Further, we only observe the latest
reconstruction year, rather than all reconstruction years.
Dataset 3: 2012 Tanzanian Census Micro Data Extract
This extract was obtained through a contact from Tanzanian Census Bureau. As opposed to the Tan-
zanian census data that can be obtained online at the IPUMS repository, this data was on individual
level. We matched these census observations from this extract to geographical areas using EA iden-
tifiers in the census extract. Using shapefiles of EAs (with the same identifiers) from the Tanzanian
Census 2012, also obtained from the same contact, we could match the census data observations to
our treatment and control areas. The process of matching EAs to treatment areas (de novo, control
and upgrading) was done through Python and ArcGIS.
In case an EA straddled two (or more) of the treatment and control areas, we performed a cut of
that EA in ArcGIS so that two (or more) parts were created, each part belonging to each treatment
and control area. We could then use this information to weight remove the census data observations
which belonged to an EA whose area inside a treatment and control area was less than 5% of the
entire EA area. We also used the information on how large a part of the EA was inside a treatment
or control area to create analytic weights based on included EA proportion for Table 6, as well as for
the adjusted population numbers used for analytic weights in Table A12.
We then took means of the variables of interest (mainly three variables which were all different
codings of the variable for educational attainment) over the cut EAs. We counted the number of
observations that contributed to the mean, to be used in the robustness check of Table 6 with analytic
weights. We also created variables for the longitude and latitude coordinates of the centroids of the
cut EAs in both degrees and meters, using ArcGIS and Python.
To create the dataset where we use entire cities as controls, we used Python and ArcGIS to select
the EAs that belonged to the same administrative district and region as the treatment areas. Then
we created means of the education variables also in these EAs, as well as counted the number of
observations that contributed to the mean, to be used in the robustness check of Table 6 with analytic
weights (Table A17).
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IPUMS 2012 Tanzanian Census by Region
We used this data, downloaded from the IPUMS online repository of country censuses, in order
to check the above-mentioned microdata extract from the same census for correctness. This was
done in particular for the education variable which had been cleaned by IPUMS staff to include
many observations recorded as having “never attended” school. The microdata that we had received
directly from the Tanzanian Census Bureau had many missing values for the education variable, and
none coded as never having attended school. The missing values in the micro-data followed the
same pattern as the “never attended” in the IPUMS data, which contributed to our decision to code
them as “Zero years of schooling”. We also checked age and gender patterns in the microdata which
also confirmed this.
Land Values
Matching Land Value Data to Enumeration Areas
We have an Excel sheet titled “RATES LAND VALUE MIKOA 10 2012.xls”, which we received from
the Kinondoni Municipal council, but were told that it was created by the Ministry of Lands, with
min, mean, and max land values for different neighborhoods in Tanzania. We can identify these
neighborhoods by four string identifiers: region, district, location, and streets. To locate neighbor-
hoods we match them based on the 2002 enumeration area (EA) shapefile, which contains string iden-
tifiers for region, district, location, and vill_stree (we consider ‘vill_stree’ comparable with ‘streets’
from the land values table).
Land Use
The Excel table has different min, mean, and max land values by land use. There are typically four
categories: Residential, commercial, commercial/residential, and institutional. Though the differen-
tiation of land values across uses is mechanical (commercial is 1.4* res, com/res is 1.1*res, institu-
tional is the same as res). Sometimes there is also a category for ‘beach plots’. Throughout we use
mean land values from the residential categories only.
Spatially Mapping Land Values
We merge EA boundaries to land value observations using the four identifiers: region, district, lo-
cation, and streets. Each entry in the land value table I treat as an observation, often this contains a
group of ‘streets’. Typically there are many EAs per land value observation, so each observation in
the land values table is matched to a large group of EA boundaries. Then we dissolve the EA bound-
aries to have a single spatial unit for each entry in the land value sheet. I plot the mean residential
land rate for each spatial unit.
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Results
The merged areas are quite large. Some roughly match our treatment areas:
1. Sinza – one unit at 240,000TSh
2. Manzese A – three partial units all at 65,000TSh
3. Manzese B – split in half, one at 65,000TSh the other at 50,000TSh
4. Kijitonyama – one unit at 325,000TSh
The other two do not match as well:
1. Mikocheni – contained by a much larger unit at 125,000TSh
2. Tandika/Mtoni – overlaps many areas of values; 40,000TSh, 30,000TSh, 50,000TSh, and 18,000TSh
These values per square meter put us in the ballpark of 125,000-325,000 TSh (2017 US$80-220) in
de novo and 18,000-65,000 TSh (2017 US$10-40) in upgrading. For the areas where we have better
matched data the ranges are 240,000-325,000 TSh (2016 US$160-220) in de novo and 50,000-65,000
TSh (2017 US$30-40) in upgrading.
Project Costs
The total cost of Round 1 was $15 million in 1977 USD ($60m in 2017 USD) where 53% was spent on
direct costs (World Bank 1984). Direct costs payed for infrastructure (largest cost component, 62%),
consultants (16%), land compensation (11%) and a few other costs. This investment covered a total of
23,161 plots: 8,527 de novo plots and 14,634 upgrading plots. This excludes the loans scheme, which
later failed because of poor repayment rates, and loan allocation.63
Round 2 cost $27 million in 1982 USD ($70m in 2017 USD) where 70% was spent on direct costs,
paying for a total of 22,106 plots: 1,978 de novo plots and 20,128 upgrading plots (World Bank 1987).
The First Round project reports (World Bank 1974a and 1984) indicate that the total infrastructure
investment costs per area in de novo and upgrading were very similar. The project report for Round
1 provided costs separately for de novo and upgrading areas (World Bank, 1984). However only
infrastructure investment differed for the two types of treatment, while land compensation, equip-
ment, and consultancy costs were reported as split 50-50 between de novo and upgrading. Direct
costs by treatment were $19 million in de novo and $15 million in upgrading areas (in 2017 USD).
To get costs per unit area we normalize by total area covered by each treatment type in Round 1 (8.5
63House improvement & construction loans (Tsh 4,000-10,000 in 1977 or 2017 US$2,000-5,000) were also arranged for to
help beneficiaries build and improve their existing houses. However, only about 4,500 loans were allocated, most to the
beneficiaries of the first stage of the project. Beneficiaries had to meet strict national building codes and a minimum value
or cost of Tsh 15,000 or 2017 US$8,000, in high density areas) and THB did not have funds to meet demand in a timely
manner.
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square kilometers in de novo and 6.5 square kilometers in upgrading). This gave costs for de novo
and upgrading areas of $2.20 and $2.37 per square meter respectively (in 2017 USD).
Further, in order to compare with present day land values (per plot area) we would like an esti-
mate of costs per unit of treated plot area. Due to data limitations we can only do that for de novo
neighborhoods where the reports give both plot counts and plot areas. Our calculations suggest an
upper bound cost of $8 per square meter of treated plot area (in 2017 USD).64
An alternative way to look at costs is to break them down by plot which we can do for both
de novo and upgrading areas. According to the report there were 8,527 de novo plots and 14,634
upgrading plots in Round 1. We can divide the direct costs of de novo and upgrading areas by
their plot counts to get $2,200 and $1,000 per plot respectively (in 2017 USD). The difference in costs
reflects both the larger size of the de novo plots and the larger share of allocated to public amenities
(such as roads).
Most of the costs were, unsurprisingly, due to infrastructure investment, which accounted for
around 60-70 percent of the First Round costs and around 55 percent of the Second Round costs. Land
compensation accounted for 10-12 percent in the First Round and 25 percent in the Second Round.
The remainder - around 20-25 percent - covered equipment and consultancy.65 Second Round costs
per plot were similar to those of the First Round, but the reports do not separate the respective shares
of de novo and upgrading (World Bank 1977b and 1987).
Cost Recovery
Costs were meant to be recovered through land rent (4% of land value a year) and service charge (the
cost of infrastructure provider), but assessment of parcels was long and interim charge well below
the adequate amount to cover the costs (100 Tsh/year or 2017 US$51) was imposed. Collection rates
were low and not timely.
Population data for 2002
To calculate the population density in each of the neighborhoods, we use data on population by
enumeration areas from the 2002 Tanzanian Census (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics 2011).
In cases where an entire enumeration area falls into a Sites and Services neighborhood, we assign
its entire population to that neighborhood. When only a fraction of an enumeration area falls into
a Sites and Services neighborhood, we assign to the neighborhood the fraction of the enumeration
area population that corresponds to the fraction of the land area that lies within the neighborhood.
The mean number of enumeration areas matched to each neighborhood is 33 for de novo areas and
64To calculate the costs per square meter of each plot, we use the planned areas of de novo plots from Appraisal report 1
(World Bank, 1974a); the planned area was 288 square meters, except for 8.56% of the plots (those in Mikocheni) where it
was 370 square meters. Taking the weighted average at 295 square meters, we can divide the de novo direct costs by total
plot area treated to get $7.5 per square meter.
65In addition, approximately 4,500 loans were allocated, over 90 percent of which were given to First Round plot owners.
It seems that cost recoupment progressed slowly, and we do not know exactly how much was eventually paid back.
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35 for upgrading areas. We also have complete population counts from the 2012 Tanzanian census,
but these data are reported in coarser, areas, and using these to measure population likely results in
more measurement error. Population counts are outlined in Table A4.
Conversion to 2017 US Dollars
All monetary values in the paper are reported in their source units and also converted to 2017 US
dollars (2017 US$). To calculate the dollar values we used the exchange rates to contemporaneous
year US$ from Penn World Tables 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). Then we used the US CPI factors to bring
the value to 2017 US$.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A1. Payoffs as Functions of I2
Notes: This figure depicts three payoffs as functions of the levels of new public infrastructure, I2. The vertical axis is payoffs, the horizontal axis is the level of
investment I2. The thick blue line is the payoff, Pi1, from the initial level of infrastructure, I1, therefore it does not vary with I2. The red line, Pi1I2, is the
payoff from not rebuilding one’s house as I2 grows. The dashed green line is the payoff, Pi2, from upgrading your house as I2 grows. Although initially the
payoff of not rebuilding is higher, it soon reaches a critical point (I2crit), where the red and dashed green lines intersect and an agent is indifferent between
upgrading and not.
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Table A1: Model Table
Scenario
1a:
(Baseline)
Scenario
1b:
Baseline
with less
weight on
infra-
structure
Scenario
1c:
Baseline
with less
patience
Scenario
1d:
Baseline
with
Boston-
level
rebuilding
Scenario
1e:
Baseline
with much
higher
building
costs
Scenario 2:
credit
constraints
incumbents
in
upgrading
cannot
build any
better than
q1
Scenario 3:
land expro-
priation
risk of 5%
per year
Scenario 4:
Baseline
with
feedback
(infrastruc-
ture
deteriorates
without
house
upgrading;
pessimism)
I1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
alpha 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
delta 0.95 0.95 0.9 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
d 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
c 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1
critical
value 5.6 21 5.6 5.6 5.6 N/A 5.6 5.6
At critical value after 30 periods:
land
value
ratio (up-
grading/
de novo)
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.92 0.32
building
quality
ratio (up-
grading/
de novo)
0.91 0.91 0.91 0.68 0.91 0.56 0.91 0.56
Notes: see model section for a description of the model parameters and the different scenarios.
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Table A2: De novo Neighborhoods
City Area within city Round Pre-treatment
satellite photos
Pre-treatment
topographic map
Dar es Salaam Sinza 1 1966 N
Dar es Salaam Kijitonyama 1 1966 N
Dar es Salaam Mikocheni 1 1966 N
Mbeya Mwanjelwa (*) 1 1966 N
Mwanza Nyakato (**) 1 1966 N
Tanga Nguvu Mali (***) 2 1966 N
Tabora Isebya 2 1978 1967
Tabora Kiloleni 2 1978 1967
Morogoro Kichangani 2 N 1974
Morogoro Msamvu 2 N 1974
Iringa Kihesa & Mtuiwila 2 1966 1982
Iringa Mwangata 2 1966 1982
Notes: This table reports the 12 de novo neighborhoods, the round in which the infrastructure investments were made, and the data we have on the areas before
the program was implemented. (*) No planned treatment maps available, areas were drawn by experts that were involved in the project at the time: Anna Mtani,
Shaoban Sheuya and the former municipal director of Mbeya, Amulike Mahenge. (**) No planned treatment maps available, areas inferred from the detailed
Mwanza central plan. (***) We have some uncertainty as to the extent of infrastructure that was actually provided in Nguvu Mali.
Table A3: Upgrading Neighborhoods
City Area within city Round Pre-treatment
satellite photos
Pre-treatment
topographic map
Dar es Salaam Manzese A 1 1966 & 1969 N
Dar es Salaam Manzese B 1 1966 & 1969 N
Mbeya Mwanjelwa (*) 1 1966 N
Dar es Salaam Mtoni & Tandika 2 1966 N
Iringa Kihesa 2 1966 1982
Iringa Mwangata 2 1966 1982
Morogoro Kichangani 2 N 1974
Morogoro Msamvu 2 N 1974
Tabora Isebya 2 1978 1967
Tabora Kiloleni 2 1978 1967
Tanga Gofu Juu 2 1966 N
Tanga Mwakizaro 2 1966 N
Notes: this table reports the 12 upgrading neighborhoods, the round in which the infrastructure investments were made, and the data we have on the areas before
the program was implemented. (*) No planned treatment maps available, areas were drawn by experts that were involved in the project at the time: Anna Mtani,
Shaoban Sheuya and the former municipal director of Mbeya, Amulike Mahenge.
Table A4: Plot Counts and Population by Project Type
Plots
completed by
1980s
Population in
2002
Ratio of
population to
plots
completed
Area (sq-km) Population
density
(people per
sq-km)
Round 1 De novo 8,527 89,150 10.5 8.5 10,488
Upgrading 14,634 200,630 13.7 6.5 30,866
Total 23,161 289,780 12.5 15.0 19,319
Round 2 De novo 1,978 17,926 9.1 2.5 7,170
Upgrading 20,128 195,378 9.7 10.2 19,155
Total 22,106 213,304 9.6 12.7 16,796
Total De novo 10,505 107,076 10.2 11.0 9,734
Upgrading 34,762 396,008 11.4 16.7 23,713
Total 45,267 503,084 11.1 27.7 18,162
Notes: This table reports completed plot counts and population in 2002 by treatment type and round.
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Table A5: Summary Statistics
Imagery
data
(Blocks)
Imagery
data
(Buildings)
TSCP
(Blocks)
TSCP
(Buildings)
TSCP
(Units)
De novo 0.206
(0.404)
0.163
(0.369)
0.022
(0.148)
0.024
(0.154)
0.027
(0.161)
Upgrading 0.314
(0.464)
0.468
(0.499)
0.019
(0.136)
0.037
(0.188)
0.057
(0.231)
Control 0.480
(0.500)
0.369
(0.483)
0.073
(0.261)
0.068
(0.251)
0.071
(0.257)
Mean log building footprint area 4.443
(0.596)
4.235
(0.848)
4.882
(0.650)
4.628
(0.696)
4.692
(0.724)
Share of buildings with painted
roof 0.155
(0.230)
0.155
(0.362)
Share of buildings with no
neighbor within 1m 0.451
(0.353)
0.309
(0.462)
Mean similarity of building
orientation -6.944
(6.203)
-6.555
(8.301)
Share of buildings with road within
10m 0.170
(0.268)
0.184
(0.387)
Share of buildings with multiple
storeys 0.111
(0.294)
0.070
(0.254)
0.088
(0.283)
Share of buildings with a good roof 0.945
(0.180)
0.944
(0.229)
0.952
(0.214)
Share of buildings connected to
electricity 0.494
(0.422)
0.446
(0.497)
0.482
(0.500)
Share of buildings with sewerage
or septic tank 0.399
(0.425)
0.366
(0.482)
0.353
(0.478)
Share of buildings connected to
water mains 0.556
(0.417)
0.500
(0.500)
0.518
(0.500)
Share of buildings with road access 0.674
(0.428)
0.617
(0.486)
0.655
(0.475)
Obs. 21,602 143,343 43,222 119,914 154,734
Notes: Summary statistics are estimates of the sample mean and its standard deviation in parentheses. Columns 1-2 display summary statistics for outcomes
derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and Services cities over the sample of observations with their centroid in either a de novo, upgrading, or control
area. Columns 3-5 display summary statistics for outcomes derived from TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga over the whole city sample.
Observations are blocks based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters for columns 1 and 3, buildings for columns 2 and 4, and units for column 5. All columns
report the maximum populated number of observations. Block outcomes are derived from all buildings with a centroid in the block. Blocks that fall between
two treatment types are assigned according to where their centroid falls. Variable Good Roof Materials has 3068 fewer observations due to measurement error
in assigning roof type to a building (outlines of the building in Dar es Salaam did not correspond to an actual building on the satellite image). Similarly, Log
Building Size and Similarity of Orientation have 4 and 14 fewer observations respectively, because of measurement error.
53
Table A6: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using Imagery Data by Building
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log
building
footprint
area
Painted
roof
Building
with no
neighbor
within
1m
Similarity
of
orien-
tation
Z-index
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Baseline Control Areas
De novo 0.408 0.055 0.062 3.404 0.284
(0.036) (0.010) (0.025) (0.377) (0.025)
Upgrading 0.038 -0.010 -0.110 0.248 -0.048
(0.033) (0.007) (0.017) (0.214) (0.018)
Obs. 143,339 140,275 143,343 143,329 143,343
Mean (control) 4.143 0.128 0.341 -7.619 0.000
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within 500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.215 0.013 -0.076 3.933 0.139
(0.038) (0.011) (0.030) (0.571) (0.031)
Obs. 35,123 33,999 35,124 35,119 35,124
Mean (control) 4.299 0.151 0.426 -9.128 0.065
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within 250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.208 0.010 -0.031 3.803 0.155
(0.038) (0.011) (0.029) (0.642) (0.033)
Obs. 20,138 19,503 20,139 20,135 20,139
Mean (control) 4.319 0.164 0.396 -9.001 0.068
Panel D: Upgrading and Control Areas 500m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.053 -0.001 -0.079 0.117 -0.025
(0.034) (0.007) (0.016) (0.227) (0.018)
Obs. 98,433 96,288 98,436 98,427 98,436
Mean (control) 4.110 0.118 0.309 -7.026 -0.018
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas 250m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.023 0.001 -0.066 0.270 -0.020
(0.033) (0.008) (0.018) (0.294) (0.018)
Obs. 55,811 54,556 55,814 55,807 55,814
Mean (control) 4.124 0.120 0.316 -7.198 -0.013
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check of Table 1 with building-level regressions. Outcomes are derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and
Services cities. The outcomes are measures of complementarity between the treatment and private investment. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the
preceding columns. Buildings are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes a de
novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, a fixed effect for
Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500
meter grid squares.
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Table A7: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using TSCP Survey Data by Building
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log
building
footprint
area
Multistorey
building
Good
roof
Connected
to
electricity
Sewerage or
septic tank Z-index
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Baseline Control Areas
De novo 0.613 0.190 -0.022 0.355 0.219 0.502
(0.078) (0.086) (0.018) (0.028) (0.050) (0.055)
Upgrading -0.009 -0.117 -0.044 0.029 -0.061 -0.136
(0.094) (0.033) (0.020) (0.052) (0.039) (0.070)
Obs. 23,921 20,351 23,858 23,921 23,627 23,921
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within 500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.561 0.131 -0.014 0.312 0.193 0.430
(0.079) (0.073) (0.011) (0.033) (0.049) (0.055)
Obs. 8,545 7,918 8,541 8,545 8,479 8,545
Mean (control) 4.719 0.122 0.977 0.501 0.347 0.099
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within 250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.493 0.091 -0.015 0.262 0.124 0.326
(0.096) (0.082) (0.018) (0.036) (0.048) (0.064)
Obs. 5,081 4,771 5,079 5,081 5,027 5,081
Mean (control) 4.780 0.175 0.969 0.539 0.418 0.187
Panel D: De novo and Entire City Control Areas
De novo 0.553 0.180 -0.002 0.324 0.196 0.483
(0.069) (0.073) (0.012) (0.028) (0.044) (0.051)
Obs. 145,946 137,797 145,554 145,878 144,264 145,946
Mean (control) 4.683 0.087 0.953 0.475 0.361 0.031
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas 500m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.035 -0.096 -0.050 0.001 -0.086 -0.163
(0.099) (0.032) (0.022) (0.052) (0.041) (0.072)
Obs. 16,217 12,930 16,158 16,217 15,977 16,217
Mean (control) 4.623 0.110 0.973 0.465 0.240 -0.005
Panel F: Upgrading and Control Areas 250m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.003 -0.105 -0.056 -0.012 -0.102 -0.180
(0.087) (0.045) (0.030) (0.055) (0.048) (0.088)
Obs. 8,346 6,914 8,317 8,346 8,309 8,346
Mean (control) 4.544 0.153 0.958 0.429 0.253 -0.031
Panel G: Upgrading and Entire City Control Areas
Upgrading -0.138 -0.150 -0.038 -0.029 -0.104 -0.229
(0.089) (0.020) (0.022) (0.054) (0.032) (0.062)
Obs. 150,612 140,948 150,200 150,544 148,868 150,612
Mean (control) 4.683 0.087 0.953 0.475 0.361 0.031
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check for Table 2 with building-level observations. Outcomes are derived from TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza,
and Tanga. The outcomes are measures of complementarity between the treatment and private investment. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the
preceding columns. Buildings are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes a de
novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city and the distance
from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares. Panels E and G display results
for the sample of blocks covering the whole city excluding upgrading and de novo areas respectively.
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Table A8: De novo and Upgrading Regressions using TSCP Survey Data (Weighted by Units per Building) with Owner Full
Name Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log
building
footprint
area
Multistorey
building
Good
roof
Connected
to
electricity
Sewerage or
septic tank
Z-index
Panel A: Baseline Model without Name Fixed Effects (Weighted by Inverse Number of Units in Each Buiding)
De novo 0.520 0.119 0.002 0.357 0.232 0.473
(0.062) (0.053) (0.013) (0.027) (0.049) (0.050)
Upgrading -0.035 -0.080 -0.083 -0.029 -0.053 -0.195
(0.080) (0.026) (0.032) (0.047) (0.051) (0.081)
Obs. 23,921 20,351 23,858 23,921 23,627 23,921
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Panel B: Owner Last Name Fixed Effects (Weighted by Inverse Number of Units in Each Buiding)
De novo 0.658 0.111 -0.016 0.382 0.250 0.503
(0.066) (0.066) (0.014) (0.029) (0.064) (0.054)
Upgrading 0.029 -0.108 -0.058 0.009 -0.033 -0.134
(0.075) (0.038) (0.024) (0.046) (0.038) (0.072)
Obs. 11,122 8,698 11,082 11,122 10,899 11,122
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Panel C: Owner Full Name Fixed Effects (Weighted by Inverse Number of Units in Each Buiding)
De novo 0.296 0.134 0.035 0.182 0.109 0.344
(0.104) (0.096) (0.038) (0.106) (0.130) (0.145)
Upgrading -0.020 -0.021 -0.013 0.280 0.041 0.086
(0.108) (0.043) (0.042) (0.079) (0.085) (0.117)
Obs. 6,493 4,655 6,457 6,493 6,311 6,493
Mean (control) 4.626 0.103 0.975 0.448 0.265 -0.000
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check for Table 3 with unit-level observations weighted by the number of units in each building. Outcomes are at the
building level and derived from TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga. The outcomes are measures of complementarity between the treatment and
private investment. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Units are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based
on where their building’s centroid falls. Each specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not
presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares. Panel A displays results for the full sample of units inside de novo, upgrading, and baseline control areas. Panel B
displays results adding unit owner last name fixed effects and further restricting the sample by dropping singletons; keeping only last name owners that appear
more than once in the sample. Panel C displays results adding owner full (first and last) name fixed effects and further restricting the sample by dropping
singletons; keeping only full name owners that appear more than once in the sample.
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Table A9: De novo and Upgrading Regressions on Persistence Measures using Imagery and TSCP Survey Data by Building
Imagery TSCP Survey
TSCP Survey,
Mbeya and Mwanza Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Road
within
10m
Road
access
Connected
to
water mains
Connected
to
water mains
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and
Baseline Control Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
De novo 0.152 0.221 0.286 0.258
(0.018) (0.052) (0.029) (0.046)
Upgrading 0.031 0.037 -0.022 -0.045
(0.012) (0.049) (0.047) (0.054)
Obs. 143,343 23,910 23,903 19,074
Mean (control) 0.153 0.647 0.510 0.529
Panel B: De novo and Control Areas within
500m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.180 0.267 0.228 0.041
(0.020) (0.063) (0.035) (0.038)
Obs. 35,124 8,542 8,539 3,796
Mean (control) 0.165 0.528 0.568 0.685
Panel C: De novo and Control Areas within
250m of De novo/Baseline Control Boundary
De novo 0.184 0.183 0.216 0.108
(0.022) (0.065) (0.038) (0.053)
Obs. 20,139 5,081 5,077 1,824
Mean (control) 0.152 0.608 0.575 0.689
Panel D: Upgrading and Control Areas within
500m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading 0.013 0.021 -0.005 -0.025
(0.013) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059)
Obs. 98,436 16,209 16,205 16,205
Mean (control) 0.156 0.729 0.526 0.526
Panel E: Upgrading and Control Areas within
250m to Upgrading/Baseline Control Boundary
Upgrading -0.008 0.017 -0.009 -0.005
(0.014) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063)
Obs. 55,814 8,341 8,339 8,339
Mean (control) 0.158 0.755 0.492 0.492
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check for Table 4 with building-level observations. Outcomes are derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and
Services cities (road within 10m) and TSCP survey data for Mbeya, Mwanza, and Tanga (road access and connection to water mains). The outcomes are
measures of persistence of treatment. Buildings are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each
specification includes a de novo and/or an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for
each city, a fixed effect for Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares.
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Table A10: De novo and Upgrading Regressions for Rounds 1 and 2 using Imagery Data by Building
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log
building
footprint
area
Painted
roof
Building
with no
neighbor
within
1m
Similarity
of
orien-
tation
Road
within
10m
Z-index
De novo 1 0.470 0.074 0.090 3.830 0.167 0.343
(0.044) (0.013) (0.031) (0.465) (0.022) (0.029)
De novo 2 0.113 -0.011 -0.082 2.410 0.070 0.047
(0.034) (0.007) (0.030) (0.693) (0.024) (0.023)
Upgrading 1 -0.007 -0.005 -0.139 0.684 0.012 -0.061
(0.051) (0.011) (0.024) (0.279) (0.015) (0.026)
Upgrading 2 0.088 -0.021 -0.075 -0.432 0.054 -0.041
(0.028) (0.006) (0.023) (0.350) (0.018) (0.022)
Obs. 143,339 140,275 143,343 143,329 143,343 143,343
Mean (control) 4.143 0.128 0.341 -7.619 0.153 0.000
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check for Table 5 with building-level observations. Outcomes are derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and
Services cities. The outcomes are measures of complementarity between the treatment and private investment. The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the
preceding columns. Blocks are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their centroid falls. Each specification includes de novo
round 1, de novo round 2, upgrading round 1, and upgrading round 2 indicators with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also included are
fixed effects for each city, a fixed effect for Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares.
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Table A11: Program Estimates by City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean
log
building
footprint
area
Share of
buildings
with no
neighbor
within 1m
Mean
similarity
of
building
orien-
tation
Share
of buildings
with road
within
10m
Z-index
(including
roads)
Empty
block
indicator
Share of
area
built up
Number
of buildings
Dar-es-Salaam × De novo 0.476 0.210 1.166 0.059 0.416 -0.048 -0.034 -3.630
(0.074) (0.047) (0.363) (0.027) (0.062) (0.038) (0.019) (0.773)
Iringa × De novo 0.193 0.010 0.374 -0.003 0.047 -0.164 0.069 0.902
(0.055) (0.051) (1.557) (0.040) (0.100) (0.081) (0.035) (0.679)
Mbeya × De novo 0.517 -0.061 2.091 0.200 0.274 -0.138 0.132 -2.995
(0.087) (0.037) (0.662) (0.028) (0.070) (0.035) (0.033) (1.481)
Morogoro × De novo -0.068 -0.261 0.526 0.006 -0.216 -0.287 0.125 2.575
(0.086) (0.060) (1.154) (0.003) (0.054) (0.084) (0.031) (0.601)
Mwanza × De novo 0.265 -0.164 7.326 0.273 0.450 -0.130 0.149 2.043
(0.057) (0.026) (0.538) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038) (0.015) (0.469)
Tabora × De novo -0.020 -0.141 2.369 0.033 0.002 -0.339 0.088 2.225
(0.053) (0.040) (0.583) (0.033) (0.046) (0.060) (0.018) (0.431)
Tanga × De novo -0.079 -0.048 0.272 0.040 0.009 -0.017 0.016 1.094
(0.149) (0.099) (3.397) (0.041) (0.051) (0.118) (0.051) (1.419)
Dar-es-Salaam × Upgrading -0.078 -0.165 -0.055 0.003 -0.146 -0.169 0.134 4.310
(0.055) (0.034) (0.230) (0.014) (0.039) (0.029) (0.014) (0.605)
Iringa × Upgrading 0.095 -0.135 2.937 0.059 0.045 -0.279 0.174 3.008
(0.054) (0.052) (0.766) (0.037) (0.059) (0.054) (0.028) (0.496)
Mbeya × Upgrading -0.035 -0.169 0.291 0.010 -0.107 -0.086 0.155 4.234
(0.107) (0.040) (0.661) (0.018) (0.065) (0.043) (0.040) (1.421)
Morogoro × Upgrading -0.173 -0.337 -3.955 0.020 -0.421 -0.467 0.244 5.598
(0.082) (0.050) (1.235) (0.010) (0.061) (0.053) (0.035) (0.613)
Tabora × Upgrading -0.090 -0.113 -1.268 0.042 -0.109 -0.357 0.102 2.985
(0.059) (0.027) (0.701) (0.027) (0.042) (0.062) (0.014) (0.458)
Tanga × Upgrading -0.227 0.021 -2.440 -0.049 -0.185 -0.233 0.090 3.392
(0.063) (0.054) (1.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.071) (0.045) (1.247)
Obs. 17,682 17,682 17,682 17,682 17,682 21,602 21,602 21,602
Mean (control) 4.392 0.502 -8.001 0.154 -0.000 0.288 0.184 5.066
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check of Table 1 breaking down treatment effects for each city. Regressions of block level observations with outcomes
derived from satellite imagery for all seven Sites and Services cities. The outcomes are measures of complementarity between the treatment and private
investment. Each observation is a block based on an arbitrary grid of 50x50 meters. Outcomes are derived from the set of buildings with a centroid in the block.
The z-index is composed of all outcomes in the preceding columns. Blocks are assigned to either upgrading, de novo, or control areas based on where their
centroid falls. Each specification includes de novo by city and upgrading by city indicators with their parameter estimates presented. Not presented, but also
included are a fixed effect for Temeke district in Dar es Salaam, and the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares.
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Table A12: De novo and Upgrading Population Weighted Regressions of Education Using 2012 Census Data
Adult Heads of Household All Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of
schooling
Exactly
primary
school
More than
primary
school
Years of
schooling
Exactly
primary
school
More than
primary
school
Panel A: Denovo, Upgrading and Control
De novo 2.087 -0.211 0.257 1.821 -0.180 0.222
(0.247) (0.028) (0.031) (0.209) (0.023) (0.027)
Upgrading -0.446 0.004 -0.040 -0.342 0.002 -0.031
(0.207) (0.022) (0.026) (0.183) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520
Mean (control) 8.320 0.532 0.352 8.509 0.515 0.378
Panel B: Denovo, Upgrading and Entire City Control Areas
De novo 2.091 -0.224 0.258 1.830 -0.194 0.223
(0.179) (0.026) (0.025) (0.136) (0.018) (0.018)
Upgrading -0.613 0.043 -0.069 -0.612 0.054 -0.075
(0.078) (0.009) (0.010) (0.076) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 18,552 18,552 18,552 18,553 18,553 18,553
Mean (control) 8.451 0.523 0.365 8.592 0.506 0.389
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check of Table 6 using population weighted observations. Regressions of cut Enumeration Area (EA) level observations
with outcomes derived from Tanzania 2012 Census microdata for all seven Sites and Services cities. The outcomes are measures of sorting into the treatment
and control areas. Each observation is a cut EA of varying size. Outcomes are the EA mean over the set of either heads of household at least 18 years old
(columns 1-3) or all adults at least 18 years old (columns 4-6) enumerated in the EA. Cut EAs are assigned to upgrading, de novo, and/or control areas if more
than 5% of the cut EA lies inside the respective area. Analytic weights for the cut EA observations used in the regression are based on the proportion of the EA
area that lies inside each treatment or control area, multiplied by the number of people (adult head of households for columns 1-3, adults for columns 4-6)
contributing to the EA mean of the outcome variable. Each specification includes a de novo and an upgrading indicator with their parameter estimates
presented. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, fixed effects for Temeke and Ilala districts in Dar es Salaam, and fixed effects for the
distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid squares. Panel B displays results
for the sample of EAs covering the whole city, which means all urban EAs within the same administrative area as the relevant treatment areas.
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Table A13: De novo and Upgrading Regressions of Building Outcomes on EA level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean
log
building
footprint
area
Share of
buildings
with
painted
roof
Share of
buildings
with no
neighbor
within 1m
Mean
similarity
of
building
orien-
tation
Share
of buildings
with road
within
10m
Panel A: De novo, Upgrading and Control, not Controlling for Years of Schooling
De novo 0.360 0.054 0.041 2.779 0.099
(0.069) (0.018) (0.043) (0.347) (0.022)
Upgrading 0.118 -0.027 -0.010 -0.325 0.032
(0.041) (0.012) (0.029) (0.324) (0.009)
Observations 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454
Mean (control) 4.269 0.169 0.397 -6.742 0.117
Panel B: Controlling for Years of Schooling of Household Head
De novo 0.290 0.039 0.012 2.545 0.092
(0.071) (0.017) (0.044) (0.350) (0.023)
Upgrading 0.130 -0.024 -0.006 -0.287 0.033
(0.037) (0.011) (0.028) (0.315) (0.009)
Years of schooling 0.038 0.008 0.016 0.128 0.004
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.044) (0.002)
Observations 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454
Mean (control) 4.269 0.169 0.397 -6.742 0.117
Notes: This table serves as a robustness check of Table 1 using cut EA observations and demographic controls. Regressions of cut Enumeration Area (EA) level
observations with outcomes derived from satellite imagery, for all seven Sites and Services cities. Each observation is a cut EA of varying size, with the mean of
the building level indicators taken over all the buildings present in the cut EA. Cut EAs are assigned to upgrading, de novo, and/or control areas if more than 5%
of the cut EA lies inside the respective area. Each specification includes de novo and upgrading indicators with their parameter estimates presented, while in
Panel B we also control for years of schooling. The years of schooling variable is derived from the 2012 Tanzanian census data by taking the EA mean of all
enumerated adult heads of household. Not presented, but also included are fixed effects for each city, fixed effects for Temeke and Ilala districts in Dar es
Salaam, and fixed effects for the distance from the city’s central business district. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by arbitrary 500x500 meter grid
squares.
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Table A14. Details on the Selection of Control Areas by City
Dar es
Salaam
• Sources: the 1974 (World Bank 1974a) and 1977 (World Bank 1977b) project proposal maps.
• De novo and upgrading: the 1974 map is used to trace areas in the north of Dar es Salaam (Kinondoni
Municipality), and the 1977 map is used in the south of Dar es Salaam (Temeke municipality).
• Exclusions: the 1974 map is used to exclude areas in Kinondoni where we identify previously established
residential areas and land reserved for special institutions and industry. The 1977 map is used to exclude
areas in Temeke where there are low density residential areas and special institutions.
Iringa • Sources: the 1977 project proposal map (World Bank 1977b), and a 1978 topographic map (Directorateof Overseas Surveys, 2015).
• De novo and upgrading: the 1977 project proposal map is used to trace areas.
• Exclusions: the 1977 project proposal map is used to exclude industrial and established residential areas
east of Mwangata. The 1978 topographic map is used to exclude already developed areas west and east of
Mwangata, and also north, south and east of Kihesa. Additionally, north of Mwangata is excluded because
of a power plant.
Mbeya
• Sources: a 1966 satellite image (United States Geological Survey, 2015), and drawings by experts on
the Sites and Services projects in Mbeya. Those experts are Shaoban Sheuya, Anna Mtani, and Amulike
Mahenge and were all interviewed by the authors in Dar es Salaam, June 30, 2016.
• De novo and upgrading: the drawings from our experts were used to trace areas.
• Exclusions: the 1966 satellite image is used to exclude areas with shops along the highway south east of
Mwanjelwa, already developed areas north west of Mwanjelwa, and the airport.
Morogoro • Sources: the 1977 project proposal map (World Bank 1977b), and a 1974 topographic map (Directorateof Overseas Surveys, 2015).
• De novo and upgrading: the 1977 project proposal map is used to trace areas.
• Exclusions: the 1977 project proposal map is used to exclude a large industrial area south west of Msamvu
and a large previously developed area to the south of Msamvu. The 1974 topographic map is used to
exclude a previously developed area south of Kichangani, and to confirm the exclusions from the 1977
project proposal map.
Mwanza • Sources: a 1973 cadastral map (Mwanza City Municipality, 1973).
• De novo: the cadastral map is used to trace areas, it delineates all surveyed plots and so contains a few
that are outside of the actual Sites and Services treatment. We include plots that are small (288m2 is the
known treated plot area) and recorded with a plot number, and community buildings. We do not include
plots that are large or that are small but do not have a recorded plot number.
• Exclusions: the cadastral map is used to exclude areas with large plots or plots without a recorded number.
Also excluded are previously developed areas along the road in the south east of Mwanza, as well as areas
to the north that are off of the map.
Tabora • Sources: the 1977 project proposal map (World Bank 1977b), a 1967 topographic map (Directorate ofOverseas Surveys, 2015), and 1978 aerial imagery (Directorate of Overseas Surveys, 2015).
• De novo and upgrading: the 1977 project proposal map is used to trace areas.
• Exclusions: the project proposal map is used to excluded previously built areas to the west and south west
of the Kiloleni. The 1967 topographic map is used to exclude an industrial area to the south of Isebeya in
between the two of upgrading area. The 1978 aerial image is used to confirm the exclusions.
Tanga • Sources: the 1977 project proposal map (World Bank 1977b), and a 1966 satellite image (United StatesGeological Survey, 2015).
• De novo and upgrading: the 1977 project proposal map is used to trace areas.
• Exclusions from control areas: the 1966 satellite image is used to exclude already developed areas south,
south west, north and east of Gofu Juu and east of Mwakizaro. The 1977 project proposal map is used to
exclude industrial area between Gofu Juu and Mwakizaro.
Notes: This table explains what imagery and maps were used to (a) delineate the de novo and upgrading areas, and (b) create exclusion areas (ie. areas to be
excluded from the control areas) among areas that are within 500 meters of Sites and Services, as explained in the Data Appendix. Sources are all georeferenced
maps of the city in question. Almost all areas in the studied cities were covered by these maps, with minor exceptions in the western areas of Tabora, and north
of the northern treatment area (Kihesa neighborhood) in Iringa.
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Table A15. Description of Variables Derived from Imagery Data
Variable label Definition
Building-level and grid-cell outcomes
Log building footprint area Calculated directly for the shape file (calculated as a direct measure for
the building, or a sample average of that measure for each grid-cell).
Painted roof Indicator for painted or clay as opposed to tin or rusted tin (an indicator
for the building or a share of buildings with painted roofs for each grid-
cell).
Building with no neighbor
within 1m
Distance to the nearest building calculated using the nearest two points
no the border of the building outlines is less than or equal to 1m (calcu-
lated as an indicator for the building or a share of buildings with nearest
building 1 m away for each grid-cell).
Similarity of orientation Calculated using the main axis of the minimum bounding box that con-
tains each building. We then calculated the difference in orientation be-
tween each building and its neighboring building, modulo 90 degrees,
with more similar orientations representing a more regular layout (an
indicator for the building or a sample average for each grid-cell).
Z-index Kling et al. 2007; Banerjee et al. 2014. We integrate all “good” vari-
ables into one index. We subtract the mean in the control group and di-
vide the result by the standard deviation in the control group. Then we
create the index by taking a simple average of the normalized variables
(a measure for the building or a sample average for each grid-cell).
Road within 10m An indicator that the distance form the boundary of the building to the
nearest roads is no more than 10m).
Distance to the CBD The CBD for each city is the centroid of the most lit pixel in 1992 from
the NOAA “Average Visible and Stable Lights, Cloud Free Coverage”
dataset. The distance to the CBD is calculated from the centroids of
each building or grid-cell.
Grid-cell outcomes only
Empty Indicator for a grid cell that has no buildings.
Share of area built Share of the area of the grid cell that is built.
Number of buildings per
50x50m
Count of buildings in a grid cell.
Note: this table describes the variables derived from Worldview and Ramani Huria building shapefiles.
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Table A16. Description of TSCP variables and how they are created
Variable label Definition
Building-level outcomes
Connected to electricity Indicator for whether a building is connected to electricity.
Sewerage or septic tank Indicator for good sanitation, i.e. having sewerage or a septic tank as
opposed to an alternative of pit latrine, no sanitation at all, or other.
Good roof Indicator for roof being made of concrete, metal sheets, clay tiles or
cement tiles as opposed to an alternative of grass/palm, asbestos, timber
or other. This is a different measure from the ”Painted roof” variable in
Table A15.
Multistorey building Indicator for one or more storeys above the ground floor.
Z-index Kling et al. 2007; Banerjee et al. 2014. We integrate all “good” vari-
ables into one index. We subtract the mean in the control group and
divide the result by the standard deviation in the control group. Then
we create the index by taking a simple average of the normalized vari-
ables.
Connected to water mains Indicator for good water supply (metered/mains as opposed to borehole;
stand tap; river; rain; water trucks; or other/none).
Road access Indicator for access to tarmac; gravel; or earth road.
Note: this table describes the variables the we derived from TSCP building data.
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Table A17. Description of Variables from Tanzanian Census 2012
Variable label Definition
Years of schooling How many years of schooling the respondent (adult or head of house-
hold adult) has obtained. Missing values in the microdata are coded as 0
since there was no category for ”Never attended school”, and since the
missing values were found to match reasonably well with the propor-
tion of people with no schooling in the IPUMS 2012 Tanzanian Census
data (which does not, however, have low level geographical identifiers).
Moreover, the proportion of missing values in the microdata increased
with age and with gender and age, which corresponds to the pattern of
people lacking any schooling in Tanzania. Respondents with Training
after primary school/Pre-secondary school or Training after secondary
school are coded as 8 or 12 years respectively, i.e. one more year than
primary or secondary schooling. Respondents with university educa-
tion, are coded as 15, i.e. one more year than the maximum number of
secondary schooling.
Exactly primary school Binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent (adult or head
of household adult) has completed exactly 7 years of schooling, 0 oth-
erwise. Missing values coded as 0 as in the variable above.
More than primary school Binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent has completed
more than 7 years of schooling, 0 otherwise. Missing values coded as 0
as in the variables above.
Note: this table describes the variables derived from the Tanzanian Census 2012 microdata.
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